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CHAPTER I' 
INTRODUCTORY 
/ 
uThe history of humanism. u wrote the late Abbe 
Br~mond,.u has not yet been written. rt1 Indeed, we may venture 
to add that humanism has never been accurately and adequately 
defined. No other word, perhaps, in our tongue is so rioh in 
associations and yet so vaguely apprehended in its radical 
and historical signification. At times it bears a mistily 
religious oonnotation as designatir~ a mild apotheosis of man. 
AgainJits import seems purely cultural, indicating the aulti-
vation or possession of a oertain broadness of mind and 
urbanity ot manner, evenJperhaps)the consoiousness of a cer-
tain worldly wisdom, and in this sense it is frequently op-
posed to the "scientific" attitnde of mind. Most oommon1~ 
however,its assooiation is literary, and this association is 
sometimes so strong as practically to &quate the terms"human-
ist" and -litt'rateur." The strict use of the word in this 
last association links it most closely with the study of the 
anoient olassios. It is olear from this state of confusion 
tha t the first task of the tu ture historian of humanism will 
be to olarify these usages, and this ta.sk oan soaroe1y be 
accomplished more safely and more suooesstul1y than by a 
- 2 
oomparative examination of the dootrines and opinions of menJ 
both of the past and of the present, to whom the title "human-
ist lf is generally given, or who themselves have olaimed the 
designation. Suoh a oomparative study, neoessarily on a mod-
est scale, is the aim of this essay. 
·For the purposes of our investigation, the wJrks of 
three men of widely different oulture to whom everyone will 
readily oonoede the title of "humani st, n Plato , Longhaye, and 
Irving Babbitt, hale been ohosen. The preoise point at issue 
oan be stated thus: Is the basio oonoern of humanism, his-
torioally oonsidered, ethioal or li terary? The reply to this 
question is briefly, that to t:re minds of eaoh of these men 
oonsidered as humanists, the main issue is ethioal, the lit-
erary issue secondary, and in eaoh instanoe the humanist's 
ohief literary tenets are strongly influenoed, if not wholly 
determined, by his solution of the &hioal issue. 
I 
Historioally, those who have claimed the title of 
ffhumanist lf have almost always been directly interested in the 
anoient olassios. At one time, we are told, a mere knowledge 
of the olassio tongues was suffioient to justify the claim. 
This interest, however, is a manifestation at best and by no 
means either necessary or infallible. The most ardent Oio-
eronians among the Renaissanoe humanists, not to speak of 
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those scholars who were drawn to the Greek culture, clearly 
confirm this. The Classics, with them, were an occasion, not 
an end. "{hat drew them to a love and study of anoient letters 
was the ideal of human life that they glimpsed beyond. As 
Babbi tt says, tlThey actually oaught a glimpse of the fine 
proportionateness of the anoients at their best. n2 Those who 
became studious of anoient sculpture and painting evidenoe thi 
ulterior motive even more olearly. That is why we must admit 
that those who oarried imitation of the ancients into the 
conduct of their lives) as well as into the style of their 
letters, were aoting consistently. They were looking for mod~ 
els of conduct even more than of epistolary eleganoe. As we 
come closer to our own times this ulterior interest is more 
am more apparent. With Father Longhaye and the School he 
• 
represents, the olassios are definitely considered a means, 
and not an exolusive one, of developing a full and propor-
tionate oulture. Babbitt states absolutely the independence 
of his wh:)le ideal from the olassics, maintaining that it was 
achieved. equally well in the Orient. 3 The truth is that in 
proportion as men have been conscious of the potencies of 
human nature they have been drawn toward an id.eal of its full, 
, 
proportionate development and have turned with eagerness to 
whatever seemed to them to ofter this ideal most completely. 
The important thing, in this connection, is the fact that the 
need for full, proportionate development is felt, for humanism 
4 
Such delimination and'dissociation brings out the 
main traits of humanism itself. It desires a full and pro-
~ortionate development of the individual. These are its 
essential notes, far more basic than the desire of the glori-
fioation of human nature, which Abb6 Bremond asserts to be 
absolutely fundamental. Not that this last can be dissocia~ed 
from the ideal. The very desire to realize , culturally, the 
fullness of the human stature implies it. But it does not 
imply what the word tfglorification" might seem to oonnote: 
the depreciation. of something else, for instance, of the 
supernatural. Proportionateness, rightly understood, should 
really exclude any such depreoiation, for a just evaluation of 
all things is of the integrity of proportionateness. The 
finished ideal might well be oalled, ethical poise. 
The ideal of ethioal poise is an answer to the uni-
versal question of the one and many in its most personal 
aspect, that of conduot. It is an attempt to satisfy the 
hunger of man's spirit for oneness, completeness, and per-
manence in a life of experience which is fragmentary, fleet-
ing, and multiple. .Against the flood of impre ssions borne in 
upon the individual and eliciting response from innumerable 
quarters, the soul sets its consoiousness of a singleness of 
purpose: happiness through the complete and lasting satisfac-
tion of the needs of human nature adequately realized and 
fulfilled. No one experience off$rs this satisfaction, 
though eaeh offerS some little part of it. 
5 
Experienoe brings 
fragmentary reports of reality beyond; man desires exhaustive 
knowledge. Experienee puts man into oontaet with isolated 
realities; he desires permanent possession of the whole. 
Experience brings partial and transient satisfaetion of indi-
vidual powers; man desires complete and permanent satisfac-
tion of his whole being, of the individual powers as con-
stituents of the vmole. The task before the individual is to 
lay hold on the prineiples of permanence and universality 
underlying experienoe. 
Among his powers mn must reeognize the sovereign.ty 
of those which ean most eompletely and universally bring him 
into contaot with reality under its most permanent aspects. 
The lesser and auxiliary powers must align themseives in due 
subordination according as they contribute toward the attain-
ment of this same end. When this order shall have been es-
tablished, the relation of man to eXpirience \"1111 be one of 
oontrol rather than of mere passivity; of selection and direc-
tion rather than of indisoriminate reeeptivity and response. 
There are those who maintain that it is not a goal 
beyond, but experience itself, whieh is the true end. To 
gain fullness in life, it is contended, is to increase and 
intenSify experience, to cram every moment to the brim. Not 
subordination, but balanoe among the powers is to be sought, 
with a view to giving eaoh the tallest range of experienoe 
possible. Permanence? They dfspa1r of it. We die. 
Ifl~ot the fruit ot experience, but expe-
rienoe, itself is the end. A oounted 
number of pulses only is gilen you of a 
variega~ed, dramatio life." 
Against them stand facts of experience, which most of us 
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learn all too early in life: the easy satiety of every indivi~ 
ual power, even ot its keenest pleasure, and the consequent 
revulsion from the very object ot satisfaction, and the in-
ability of an indefinite number of distinct actsJwhioh bring 
each its partial pleasure) to produce, in sum, happiness. As 
a matter of fact, such a series, were it possible, would lead 
to the same revolting satiety. Happiness is not the sum of 
pleasure; it ~anscends pleasure. It must consist in the 
single act of permanent possession of the one objeot whioh 
can satisfy the whole man. Our only chanoe for happiness is 
to bend all aotivity, qualitatively and quantitatively, toward 
the possession ot this object. Ordered power, as opposed to 
indisoriminate intenSity, in aotion, with all that "order" 
implies ot direction, selection and purpose, is the key-note 
of humanistiC poise. 
With thiS, I believe, we have reached true oottom. 
It adequately oovers the striking similarities in all presen-
tations of humanism; it alone makes adequate provision for 
the even more. arresting di versi ty~ It can readily be seen 
how doctrines, which agree on this point, may differ "toto 
caelo."' The details of the ideal will depend upon the view 
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taken of human p.ature itself and of man'$ place in the world. 
The positivist will elaborate this ideal in a way which the 
realist mustl in part) re ject. The pagan, born or self-made, 
and the Chri stian he,re will meet and part company and yet, 
within the terms we have laid down, the name "humanist" can 
ue denied to none. 
The humLmists whom we shall study in the following 
chapters were chosen with this in mind. Their divergences 
are a') :par en t to the mos t superfioial reader; their similari ty 
is even more apparent to one who studies them critically; and 
both si~ilarity and divergence centers on the point mentioned. 
II 
Although the ethical issue is uppermost in the mind 
of each of these humanists, they are all)nevertheless,deeply 
concerned with the problems of literary criticism. In 
Babbitt's ease the literary interest seems to have been the 
starting point of his speculation on the question which came 
eventually to supersede it in his mind. He eame to give his 
chief attention to the ethioal question because he saw that 
the true solution of many basie literary questions, in fact 
of the whole cultural issue/lay here. Plato, himself a poet 
and th e prince of stylists I had ever tre cause of literature 
at heart, and though he passes severe judgement on it at times 
this is only because, while recognizing the superior claims 
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of ethics, he could not see his way clearly to the settle-
ment of some delicate points of adjustment between literature 
and morals. Father Longhaye brought to his speculation on 
literature a mind already formed along sound philosophioal 
lines and for him the ethioal issue was settled. But this 
in no 'Clay imped.ed his literary Judgment. On the contrary,it 
gives him a distinct advantage beoause it enables him to 
disentangle and elucidate issues which to the mere li1t~rat~r 
are hopelessly muddled, and, to the thinker who is trying to 
reach a solution of the ethioal issue from a baSis in litera-
ture, present proolems almost equally hopele ss of solution. 
As a oonsequence, his c onclusions J though sometime s rigid) are 
always lucid and for the most part irrefragable. Although 
our chief conoern here must be an examination of the ethioal 
doctr ines of these humB.llll.i sts we shall) neverthele ss) be -oetter 
equipped oy this very examination to understand more oomplete-
ly their ari ti oal opinions,. VIe shall} therefore} ven ture to 
point out the associations between their oritical and ethioal 
Views, and. to trace/in the ethioal, the roots of the literary. 
To examine the worth of the oritioal tenets themselves is 
obviously a f'urtl;er task beyond our present scope; some adum-
bration of where the preferenoe would lie, however, even in 
the literary issue, cannot fail to appear in the examination 
of' the ethical doctrines. -
A word concerning the seleotion of the works examined 
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will not be out of place. !he Republic, as the oentral and 
most dogmatic statement of Plato's thought upon many subjects, 
is an obvious choice. The Belles - Lettres of Longhaye re-
commends itself as obviously a more ~itable treatise than 
either the History or ~ Predication. In the case of Babbitt 
it has been no easy matter to concentrate upon a mngle work. 
Since his writings are mostly critical, the positive aspect 
of his doctrine must be gathered piece-meal from them all. 
Rousseau ~ Romanticism has, however, given yeoman service as 
a good summary of the substance of his teaching on this pOint. 
I 
~CES 
CHAPTER I 
1 Henri Br$mond: A Literarr History o~ Religious 
Thought In Franoe ,(Naw York, .tiomll an, 1928), p. 6. 
-
2 Humanism And Ameri.oa, (New York, Farrar and 
Rinehart, 1930). p. 26. 
3 Rousseau And Romantioism, (New York, Houghton 
Mifflin Co., 1§1§), p. XiX. 
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4 Walter Pater: Renaissanoe, (New York, Maomillan, 
1908), p. 249. 
\ CHAPTER II 
IRVIliG BABBITT'S 
IDEAL OF ETHICAL DECORilld 
The late Abbl Br~mond wrote, with referenoe to the 
humanists of the Renaissanoe: 
nThe day is not far distant when a new 
humanism, less exuberant, out also oeliev-
ing, less tradioniste, than the earli~r, 
will oause more serious disquietude. uL 
11 
From all indications, his prediotion has been fulfilled in 
the dootrine of Irving Babbitt and his followers. That this 
new humanism is lass believing, less tradioniste, than the 
earlier is apparent at a glance. Tba t some disquietude has 
ac oompanied its rise is al so true, and the judgme nt of Pro-
fessor Meroier that it is a doctrine we may disapprove, out 
dare not overlook, finds a wide eoho.2 But, one may ask, to 
whom has it br;)ught disquietude? On this point the propheoy 
of Abbe Br~mond does not find so accurate a fulfillment. He 
thought tha t the ohampions of the traditional faith and of 
the elder learning WDuld have most to fear, while, in faot, 
they alone oan look with equanimity, even with some approval, 
on the infant philosophy. While the humanism of the Renais-
sanoe was the initial step on the road whioh ultimately led 
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to naturalism, the humanism whioh the Harvar~ professor advo-
cates, with all the ardor of a oonseerated apostle, is at its 
very eore a protest against naturalism. The noonservative lf 
and fftradi ti onal, If no t to say reaotionary, soho ols have noth-
ing to fear from suoh a oreed beoause they have long sinoe 
learned that between naturalism and supernaturalism there is 
no compromise. Unless the new movement oeats a retreat to 
the naturalistio plane upon realizing this, we may hopefully 
expect the-trirunph of the full truth in the minds of those of 
its proponents who sinoerely seek the truth. 
I have spoken of Babbitt's humanism as a dootrine. 
It is just that, and has in this faot its essential marks of 
differentiation. Humanism in Plato was an immanent quality 
of soul. The humanism of the Renaissanoe, was an enthusi-
asm, an overflow of animal spiri ts. Of Christian Humanism, 
I' ~ 3 Abbe Bremond says: "It is essentiaUyatemper of mind. n The 
hlli~anism of Irving Babbitt is a "gospel",professing to offer 
a oomplete philosophy of life and salvation to our age. Of 
course, it VJas not always so. The first volume he published 
was a oolleotion of essays in defense of the hwnanities. 
Al though tte se oontain in embryonio form, as Meroier p-)ints 
out, the whole of his dootrine, Babbitt does not appear to 
have realized at the time the ramifications whioh would be-
oome neoessary. His own development seems to be an instanoe 
in proof of his oDservation that the "eoonomio problem would 
13 
be seen to run into the philosophic, etc. n4 The defense of 
the humanities, he oame to see, is but one small portion of 
the fight which must be waged against the solvent and lique-
fying foroes of na. turalism. He felt' tm t he had c orne upon 
the oasic fallacy of naturalism which vitiates its every con-
clusion. He struck, as he thought, at the root of the evil. 
But he did not strike merely to destroy. He had something 
to offer in place of what he had torn down. In each succeed-
ing volume, as he worked out his theory into various fields, 
literary criticism, economicS, morality, he came closer and 
closer to his final stand: a philosophy of life upon a human-
istic principle. Upon this he seems to have rested, though it 
is said he had embraced a superna tural belief oefore his 
death. His writings do not reveal this ultimate development. 
As they stand they my, for our purpose, oe considered as the 
final expression of his matured thought. 
I 
On one sLde Babbitt's position is a protest against 
the attempt to build a whole philosophJT of life on a natural-
istiC foundation. 5 The effect of naturalism in both its 
forms, he maintains, scientific and sentimental, is to level 
things off to a common basis. This is its answer to "the 
One and the :Hany." Scientific naturalism does away with the 
14 
distinction oetween man, as man, ~d nature, maintaining that 
marl is but a part of na. ture and nothing more. Sentimental· 
naturalism does away with the distinction between the higher 
~~d the lower self. With the help of its scientific counter-
part, it answers the question of the nOne and the M:any" by 
lifting the many to a false unity in instinct and emancipat-
ing the expansive desires from an "anachronistic" power of 
control. 6 Both these seem to Babbitt to ·be but sorry judg-
mentsjoased on superficial observation and hasty reasoning. 
While it is true, in a sense, tha.t man is a part of na. ture, 
it is just as true that his part in it is that of king. It 
is neitl::er possible nor desirable, he admits, to deny alto-
gether the olaims of the natural man. .But eXgerience teache s 
that, unless subjected to some can.trol, the natural desires 
bring havoc into the life of man. 
The basic problem for one who would oppose naturalism, 
says babbitt, is to find the best means of re-asserting the 
human law/as opposed to the law for things, that is,the law 
which must govern the life and conduct of man, if he is to 
achieve th e end of his existenoe t as opp.)sed to that govern-
ance in the physioal world which suffices to bring unintelli-
gent things to the fnlfillment of thei~ destined tunotion. 7 
Naturalism has confused these laws even to the denial of the 
human law in favor of the law for things. 8 It seeks to bring 
everyt::ling under the law for things. Only a vigorous re-
- 15 
assertion of the faot that there is a distinct law for man can 
confute naturalism. But it is futile, Babbitt thinks, to 
turn to authority or tradition for suoh a re-assertion. Han 
haS travelled too far along the experiential road for that. 
The whole naturalistic position is built on just this ex-
periential ground, and much in it is true, though needing re-
interpretation and completion. 9 Naturalism claims to be posi-
tivistic and critioal; it can be refuted and confounded only 
by a still more severe and positivistic criticism. Naturalism 
has been posi ti vistic and cri tical, but only on the side of 
-
the natural as opposed to the human law. It has been pre-
occupied with establishing, on critical and positivistic 
ground~man1s kinship to the brute. The new positivist must 
be critical on both sides; he must push on to the establish-
ment of the human" as well as of the natural, law on a posi-
ti vis tic basis. Thus only will modernity triumph over pseudo-
modernity and critiCism confute sophistr7. 
The critical positivist, as Babbitt depicts him, is 
necessarily an individualist.10 This does not mean that the 
critical positivist will reject every exterior standard to 
make himself the measure of all things. It means that he 
assents to human standards on personally positivistic grounds, 
for human standards are nothing more than the embodiment o'f 
that element o'f oneness in life which is a matter of experi-
ence. It is the individualism of immediate, in the sense of 
-'ersonal, perception of the normal a.nd representative in 
A(; : 
_ hUJIlan exp er ienoe • 
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But what is the problem with whioh this individual, who 
would live by human standards, is faced? Ultima tely, and in the 
widest sense, that of happiness; more proximately;the ethioal 
solution of the pro olem of the nOne and the Many. nl1 This 
last is a universal problem. It manifests itself, writes 
.Babbitt, in every phase of life and nature. ~ow, ontological-
l~as the distinction between the elements of change and per-
manence; again, for the intellect, as illusion and realit~ 
whioh oorrespond to change and permanenoe respeotively; and, 
nearer at home, in man himself, ethically as the dualism of 
his nature: the multiplioity of his deSires, and the unity 
of his power to say "no." ];iust the problem be attaol{ed in all 
its aspeots? No, acoording to Mr. Babbitt, for this would be 
futile. 12 Because the element of ohange enters into man's 
very nature, he cannot solve the problem metaphysically at 
all. What reall ty he rray know is a.lways inextricably bound 
up with illusion.13 Illusion, ohange, enters into the very 
notion of personality itself, existentia propria. The only 
sane way out is to narl' O\V the pro blem down to a que stion of 
the praotioal oonduot of life. This means that we must 
decide whether multiplioity and unrestraint or unity and con-
trol will rule our lives. On whiohever side the ohoice falls, 
the deoision must be measured in human happiness, the ultimate 
jlter10n 01' ~11~14 Natura11.a haa' ta,ea the same ,roble. and 
;~f~01ded 1n favor 01' mult1p1101t,- an4 UJU'estra1nt. Natun.l1sa 
, " 
, i'!oons1ders man merely a.s a part otnature and sinoe nature 1s 
,'al_'s ohang1ng and evolv1ng, so too 1s man. The t1n t, to .... rd 
, _hioh huJDB.n standar48 asp1re 18 11100l'llpat1ble w1 th thla vlew 
tt man. Naturallsm conslders man 11ttle. 11' anyth1ng, mol" 
tban a. brute. and the only un! ty known to the llfe 0'1 the 
'1"I1te 1s the 1nd1sor1minate response to 1nstinot. So 1n 1ts 
.on08,t10n of 11te natura11sm holds up the unrestra1ned sur-
'render to ail ele.ental mOTements as an 14eal. !he tru1t ot 
IlAturallsm. whep. we1ghed 1n the 80ales of h,.an happ1nes8, 1s 
tound wantlng .15 It 1s t1me to assert un1 t,. the human law, 
wh10h tells ue that man 1s more than a part 0'1 uature and 
aore than the sum of hls des1re •• 
In tak1ng u, thls poslt10n. Babbltt goes 011, one ls 
Done the less p081tlvlstl0 and or1tlo&l. for the human law 1s 
matter of experlenoe, wa taot 01' immediate peroeptlon, the 
presenoe 01' & power of oontrol ln the In'1Tld~1.w16 !h1s 
taot, ooupled wlth another taot ot exper1enoe. man's 1nnate 
moral 1ndo1enoe, 1s at the basls ot humanlstl0 eth10s. A man' 
splrltual vlgor ls .ea&Ured by hlsexaroise 01' the one anA the 
ftnqulsh1ng of the other. By the keenness 01' a man's perl.p-
t10n at th1s dual taot 1s to be .easure' his 1ns1ght lnto the 
human law. And the aooeptanoe 01' th1s T1ew binds hlm to the 
greateet possible etfort. Jf he CaQ exero1se control. he must 
40 eo for h1s own happine •• ' sake.1f 
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But at this point theposi tivistio individualist finds 
himself oonfronted with the question of standards. It is one 
thing to be oonsoious of a power of control, another to for-
mula te standards for it s guidanoe. In general) there is the 
oriterion of happiness. The hu.l1lanist will consent to no 
ourtaillJent of his desires which does not make for happiness~8 
But something more speoifio is neoessary. Consistenoy bids 
him turn to exper ience in this pass also. To his own ex-
perience alone? No, for that would preoipitate him into the 
amorphous individualism of th9 naturalist. Furthermore, the 
consciousness of his own moral indolenoe ought to lead him to 
look with respeot to those who, in the past, have in some 
degree reached the spiritual vigor towards whioh he strives. 
He will turn, then, to the experienoe of mankind to seek a 
model for imitation. In dOing so he will not relinquish his 
ori tioal and posi ti vistio posi tion, for he will aooept it only 
as experienoejand not as authority1and will subJeot it to the 
keenest analysis of whioh he is oapable. 19 Neither will he 
restriot the experience upon whioh he wi 11 draw, out inoludes 
in a generous gesture both East and West. Experienoe of life 
oan be of three kinds, naturalistio, humanistic, an:t relig-
ious. 20 Will he restrict his choice here? Yes, and that on 
the criterion of the fruits of each in the past. We have 
seen what naturalism does in the Romantic excesses. 2l To 
pass too abruptly fram the naturalistio to the religious level 
19 
bELs led men to much self-deception in the past. 22 Hwnan, 
secular experienee seEmS to be the only solution/to Babbitt's 
mind. 23 
The rejection of experienoe merely on the naturalistic 
level in the formation of standards seEmS amply justified by 
the evidenae lIr. Babbitt has oollected 0 f the bitter fruit ot" 
Romantio naturalism. But what is the reason for his distinc-
tion between the human and the religious (supernatu..ral)? 
Babbitt's preferenoe for the human is tentative. 24 Humanism 
needs religionjout not vice-versa, he says, beoause the eth-
ical life is based on humility. They must be looked upon as 
different stages in the seme path. One must be eased) as it 
were, fran the trough of naturalism to the religious height 
on the gentle inoline of humanism. Consequently, humanisn 
must possess some religious insight. 25 It is possiole for a 
humanist to be at once mediati veand humble. Mr. Babbitt 
suggests a foundation for this humility in the dootrine, or 
rather fact, of moral indolence which, he says, in some way 
would resemble the Christian doctrine of original sin, with 
the added advantage, however, tha tit would not jar the 
sensitive ear of the man not yet wholly free from natural-
istiC preJudioes. 26 ThiS, in addition to a respeottnl atti-
tude toward the experienoe of the past, will furnish the 
religious inSight needed. 
The critical positivist has yet the task of drawing 
( 
.: ...... . 
\'frODl the exper1ence he has oho.en a worltablJt' m04el tor 1m1 t&-
,"etl0n • H1s att1 tucle, we have ... n, wUl have th1s m:a.oh ot 
hUDll11ty, that he 1s wil11ng to l ... n, and oonscious of h1s own 
shortoomings; he 1s seek1ng staD4aHs aCGord1ng to wh10h he 
will exeroise the sp1r1 tual t1re of his 1nns. te pow.r of oon-
trol. By what means 1s he to ereot these standards trom the 
lead mater1al of the past and rev1vify 1t to the present? 
leason, 1mag1nation, and the or1ter1on of representat1veness 
01' norma11ty, by which last ean only be meant Widespreat 
reourrenoe and produot1on of the greatest hu.man happ1ness. 2? 
When the or1tioal human1st shall have formed these standards 
and have d1so1plined 1~ulse to the1r measure he shall have 
reaohed his goal, deoorum, whioh Babb1tt def1ne. as "the pull-
1ng baok of 1mpulse to the proport10nateness wh10h has been 
peroe1ved. aB8 It seea. neoessary to examine at this po1nt 
the part to be played by eaoh of these f'aoul tie. s 1n the work 
of the erection of standards. !h1s is by no means the sim-
plest task 1n the grasp1ng of Mr. Babb1tt's pos1tion. ne is 
oareful to prepare us somewhat. 1n the prefaoe to Rousseau and 
-
!omantio1sm. for the role he intends to g1ve to the 1magina-
tion. 29 Ult1mately, all seems to go baok to his att1tude to-
ward the ep1stemological problem. For him,the prob1am is 
inoapable of metaphysioal solut1on. All the reality man oan 
grasp 1s known through a veil of 1l1usion. !h ere fore , the 
soundness of the only solut1on posa1ble for him, the ethi.al 
----------------------------------------------------~ 
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solution, rests on the: right use of illusion, rests on the 
pro yer use of the right kind of imagim. ti on. 30 
There is imagination and imagina tion.l says Mr. Babbitt t 
but every kind is not effioient for our end. It was by a 
sheer mistaking of this much known, but little understood, 
faculty that Romanticism was led into some of its most egre-
gious errors. Hr. Babbitt. distinguishes broadly two kinds of 
imagination: the classic and the romantic) and these are at 
poles on e.very major point. 3l The Romantio has at its core 
the strainin.g away from the actual; the classic finds in the 
actual its oenter an d point of departure, in a sense, its 
norm; the romantic revels in the unique, the eccentrio, the 
erratic, the purely personal; the cassic seeks to disengage 
from the welter of the aotual what is representative and 
nonnaJ.. 32 The imagination which the cri tioa.l humanist will 
press into his service) in erecting from the experienoe of the 
past a model fo r his own conduct, is the ethical imagination, 
which is best defined as the olassic imagination ooncentrated 
on the human law. 33 The humanist will seek to disengage the 
normal an.d representative from the experience of the past 
to be held up as a model for the exercise of the power of 
control. 
This is not. a mirage, Babbitt goes on, for despite 
the. vast difference which may exist between convelltion and 
conven tion as removed by time t eto. t the re a.re perceivable 
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in the flux a constant element, oertain "unwritten laws of 
ven 1134 hea • This is a fact of experience, for we find in 
1'11'1 ters of ancient times J and of OQnven tions far removed from 
our own) truths of human experience which are valid today, 
maxims of conduct which are still vital. 35 It is easy to see 
where the critioal power must enter here. It will De the 
office of reason to keep the critical positivist,who is thus 
exercising the imagination.lin touch with reality, first of all 
wi th the reality of the facts of past experience on which he 
is drawing, and secondlYlwith the reality of his needs in 
making the necessary ad jus tmen ts to the pre sent. For this 
work not every exercise of the reason will do. Here I!r. 
Babbitt distinguishes the meanings of "reason. R36 He enumer-
ates first/the mathematical reason, secondlY,the reason of 
oorm:l.on sense, and la stly, imagina ti ve reason. The ma thema t-
ician 1 s reason can help not at all. Good sense, which "may 
exist in many grades ranging from an intuitive mastery of 
some field to that of the ethos of a whole age," comes much 
nearer the need. riut in the past this good sense has come to 
be conceived of as opposed to imagination. 37 This error must 
be rectified oefore one has the kind of reason needed: the 
reason of good sense sublimated by union with that power 
whereoy it is "enabled to go beyond the conventions of a par-
ticular tinle and country and lay hold... on the unwritten 
laws of heaven. n38 It is the work of this reason, having 
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I$l'pasped the oentral facts of pa.t experienoe, to relate thea 
: to reality in the past) to prevent groundless idealizing) and 
. to fit the se faots into the pr •• ent. !J!he work of the ethio&l 
~ination is to mold these faots)on which the imaginative 
reason has laid hold,into a permanent rounded model for imita-
tion. The imagination gives unity, the reason reality. For 
what is unity without reality? !he Romanticists found it and 
ended in being completely submerged in its falseness. What 
1s reality without unity? Nightmare.39 But we must not . 
forget, while thus analyzing his pOSition, that the oritioal 
positivist ultimately takes his stand on inSight, which ~. 
Babbitt defines as "the immediate perception of something 
,anterior to thought and feeling, known practically as a power 
of oontrol. ,.40 !J!his insight and the exercise of this power 
of control is the measure of' man's spiritual vigor. !J!o give 
permanence to the action of this power he must cultivate 
habits in the line of control.4l A man who Shall fulfill 
these things shall be on' the high roa4 to the land of Heart's 
])tsira for the humanist: decorum, which is defined as "onl,. 
the pulling baok ~f impulse to the proportionateness whieh 
has been percei.,.ed with the aid of wha.t one may term. the 
ethioal or generalizing imagination. w4a 
II 
Bab~ltt1s basic fallaoy lie. in his attitude toward 
24 
ftha t aspeot o:f the question or: the One andr.iany whioh he 
salls the epistemologioal problem. He aooepts the oontinuity 
of the flux. Life presents a oneness whioh is always ohang-
ing. ~he element of oneness is always assooiated with re-
ality, the element of cl~g~"as every psychologist knows," 
with illusion. This ceaseless change is not a thing apart 
from Iran which, swirling about him, yet leaves 11in unmoved. 
He is himself a part ot the flux, a oneness which is always 
ohanging. Oneness and change, reality and illusion are in-
extricaoly intermingled within man himself as well as outside 
him, so that "whatever ~eality man ca~ know is inextrioably 
mixed up With illusion. n43 Illusion is an integral part ot 
his intelleotua 1 life. 
The first slip seEmS patent. Ba-bbitt opposes the 
oonst~:~n t e lemen t to the elemen t o:f ohange as reality to illu-
sion. Yet on what defensiDl e grounds? What is there to 
compel us to oonclude that what remains is real, while that 
whioh passes is only a fiotion of the mind? Let us take an 
example, prosaio enough in itself, but to the point; sinoe it 
strike~ not only at this error, but at the one whioh follows 
immediately. In a growing ohild we see the one person~lity 
rapidly passing through stages of' phYsioa.l and. mental develop-
ment, from the night of in~rtioulate~ess and helplessness, 
through the beautiful dawn of consoiousness into the noon of 
intelligent speeoh, purpose:ful aotivity and the vigor o:f 
~ •.. , '-----------------------------____ .......J 
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young manhood. or womanhooci. 'l!h$ oneness here cannot be 
questioned. We recognize tha.t it i$ the same person who 
displays the various traits discovered day by day, as the 
personality unfolds itself. Nor wOQld anyone hesitate to 
associate this oneness with reality. But were these changes 
illusions or fiotions, because they passed, shaken from the 
shoulders of the youth like outworn garments? Obviously not. 
Babbitt has failed to distinguish properly between substanoe 
and acoident. An acaident, whioh inheres in a subJect for a 
time and then passes away, is· not unreal beoause it is unlast-
ing. A amall boy's littleness is not a fiction of the mind 
because the boy will soon grow into a man and his smallness 
change to fUllness of stature. 
Consider the growing child in another light~ He is 
not u...'1.ique, but on.e of a large group t the mambers of whioh 
have a perfeot resemblance to one another in some common 
note, here, the note of growing childhood. Considered so, he 
presents another aspe ct of the 04e and the Many which troubles. 
Babbitt greatly •. As an individual in a olass he is but· one 
example of something general and oommon to all the individuals 
of that olass. But in reality, in things as they are, only 
the individual s exis t; as Ba hb:i tt would say t only th e many. 
Babbitt's diffioulty in either case lies in determin-
ing just what we can know. Led on by his predeterminati. ons 
he falls into theposi ti vistio trap and ooncludes, "only that 
" 
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::;ts real whi ch is imma dis. tely percei ved. ,,44 A.ll else is illu-
,ion. Obviously we cannot know illusions. In the first case 
we parcei ve, not the perSisting) nor the changing element but 
• persistent eleman t which ahanges. The change i s associated 
wi th i.Llusion and aannot be the ob je at of knowledge. The 
~, proper object of knowledge here iSI consequentlYj the persistent 
'element grasped through the I'veil of illusion. "45 In the 
second case we percei va imrnediately only the individual. 
!herefore, weaus t deny reality to the common note. All we 
can know is tte individual persistent element and that only 
r ,. as modified by illusion. No a~ute universals; not even an 
,absolute individual. 
Some alleviation of this distress may come, of a 
sketchy statement of the view of philosophy onthesa points. 
It is true that in things as they are the elements of change 
and perman.enoe are inextrioably intermingled, that the un-
iversal has but potential being in individuals. But one 
must, despite the psychology Babbitt invokes, deny that the 
changing element is to be aSSOCiated with illusion and re-
pudiate the gr~dlessassumption that reality can be pre-
dicted only of objects of immediate perception. While in the 
ontological order these eleman ts are indi ssolubly united, in 
the logical. order they oe.n 't)e separated. The mind oan dis-
entangle and alassify. The legitimate products of induotion, 
general conoepts, are valid and have reality. though they 
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";Jtist in tre logioal order only. a.s universals. Their reality 
iis founded in that perfeot simili~de existing in the ontolog-
iaal ord.er between the individuals of any olass. :,:an's know-
. 
ledge is not limited to individuals, since the universal, 
verified in indiViduals, is real anQ the valid objeot of oog-
nition ; neither is all known reality bound up with illUSion, 
nor even wi th ohange, for man knows essenoes, the essenoes 
even of the changing elements, and these essenoes are real, 
'; eternal in possibility, immutable in aotion, neoessary in 
consti tution. 46 
To dwell at suoh length on the epistemologioal diffi-
oulties involved in Babbitt's position would be inexousable 
were it not that momentous issues affecting the soundness of 
his entire struoture depend from them. His attitude here"it 
seems, gives immed.iate rise to the three most distinotive 
characteristios of his system: the unique (and exaggerated) 
t,\ view of the imagination, the insistenee on a power of oontrol 
: 'as the basis of spiri tual effort, an insistenoe whioh has 
~i 
,w 
led some to class him outright as a voluntarist, ani the 
ultimate inadequaoy of his finished ideal of humanistio de-
corum. 
Taking his stand on th e positivistic' maxim, (quite 
t undemonstra blEt, by th e way, am. tha.t not because it is self-
(eVident), that "only that whioh.is immediately peroeived is 
I 
r i real,n he is naturally led to seek some fact of immediate 
f< 
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;.erception upon which to found his re-assertion of the human 
: law. This he thinks to have found in a dualism within the 
',' individual, and;more particularly .... in one aspeot of that du-
alism. It is a faot of immediate, individual experienoe that 
.• hile each faoul ty is eager for i tsown sa tisfaotion irre~ 
spectively of any other, the eye of all seeing, the ear ot, all 
hearing, eto., man is oapable 01 oontrolling this innate 
essential tendenoy. He oan restriot the use of one faoulty 
to favor the exeroise a:lf another, and can determine aoti vi ty 
Doth ~uantatively and qualitatively. This power is the one 
'absolute. It is anterior and Sllp.erior to thought and. feeling 
and it is immed.iately evident. It is man's distinotiveohar-
aoteristio)whioh sets him a oreature apart, lifts him above 
the flux, gives unity and purpose to his life. It is but 
logical and Just that it should beoome the head of the oorner 
in the new ethios. 
No fault oan honestly be found with thiS. This power 
• is pre~ent, is distinctive, does give unity in a sense. It 
is to oertain nuanoes, oer,tain implications, even accretions, 
to which one must)in the name of common sense;take exoeption. 
The first springs from the depreoiation of the intelleot and 
oonsists in the assertion, some times explici t, sometimes impll 
t;· ed, that the Higher Will is not only prior to intellect in 
. dignity but, in some obscure way. prior in faot. It is the 
elUSive, tantalizing aBsumptionof this faot whioh has led 
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sorne to pronounce the condemnation of voluntarism upon him. 
He appeals to the East 47 for a precedent in the matter, but 
to 'vJhat avail? This is but to involve Eastern thought in his 
own condemnation. Nor need we rrake too much of the matter 
siLce he himself admits that the power must be used "intel-
ligently.n48 But it presents a real difficulty, unless we 
press this admission, and for clarity it is well to consult 
the teachings of philosophy upon the matter. 49 
The dispute as to the priority between will and intellect 
strikes one as rather futile. The nexus between them is so 
close that one is tempted. to waive the whole matter. But it 
is manifestJupon due reflectionJthat the will is certainly 
prior in digni ty/ since with it rests the ul t irna te po sting of 
the human act. The intellect, however, is prior in activity, 
since it alone can present the alternatives between which the 
will must choose. We use intellect to mean, of course, the 
mind in the exercise of its powers both of analysis and syn-
thesis, and not in the restricted sense in which we shall 
find Babbitt using the word. st. Ignatius Loyola well illus-
trates this necec:sary d.ependence of will upon intellect, at 
the same time ascril')ing to the will the liberty which becomes 
it and constitutes its dignity, when he urges upon his 1'01-
lowers)not merely coni'ormi ty of act) but also of intella ct and 
Judgment in the exercise mf. obedience, meaning that they 
Should strive to grasp the Su)erior's point of view in any 
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given order, sinoe "the will oannot for long obey against the 
und.erstC:l..nd.ing. "50 By interpreting Babbi tt' s f'intelligentlyff 
with generous latitude, we may point out the d.iffioulty with-
out exaggerating it. 
A further defeot which cannot be so l~ppily d.isposed 
of; and whioh has its origin in the failure to appre cia te the 
true relation 01' will and. intellect, manifests itself in the 
opposition of the power of control to the "ord.inarylT will. 
The ;'ord.inary:l will is that native tendency of man, consider-
ed. as a composite of faculties and powers, or of the powers 
COrlsidered. in themselves, to seek full, unrestricted. satisfac-
tion and. activity. This tendenoy is the real oause of the 
expansiveness of desire of which Babbitt speaks so frequently. 
The pre sence of this tendenoy is a faot of immed.iate experi";' 
ence. '.rhe power to c'.:ntro 1 this tendency is al so a fact of 
immediate perception. This power he oalls the "Higher Will" 
and. opposes it to the expansive tendency of desire as to a 
"Lower 'Hill.1I Let us grant, for the moment, that a !1Higher 
Will!1, just as Babbitt conceives it, does exist; it becomes 
immeG.ia tely apparen t tha t such a power cannot be opposed to 
the 1ford.inarylT wi 11. Both the Ifhigher ll and the ord.inary 
wills, Babbitt would. admit, tend toward. the perfecting of 
man's nature, the 1Tlower" blindly, the flhigher IT intelligently. 
The only ground upon whioh the s-upremacy of the lIHigher Will" 
could. be asserted is tha t th e perfection of man's nature is 
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attained. more fully or ~nore easily und.er its guid.ance. In 
thiS case, the relation of the rJlIigher r;ill~l toward. the 01'-
d.i nary wi 11 should be one 0 f directi ve co - J )U:;'12. t ion./ ra ther 
tilan of inhibitory opposi tion, since the ord.inary will has tre 
e end as the "HLo:her Will. tf sao ~ Viewed.. in this way, there is 
some ground. i'or the comparison which has been drawn between 
Babbi ttl s I1Higher Will" and the rational appeti te of the 
Aristotelians. But Babbitt himself did not conceive the 
"Hi'her '/[illll as directive so muoh as inhioitory. There is 
no r,")om ill human nature for a purely inhibitory power. 
This fai lure to dea 1 adeqw3. tel.y wi th th e rela ti on 
between intelleot and. will leads to a further d.evelopment, 
one which Professor ::eroier hai ls with an enthusiasm it is 
hard. to share. 5l This is nothing less than a mild ciivinizing 
of the power of oontrol. The argument as Professor :Ieroier 
sums it up runs thus: IIIan is consoious of a power 0 f oontrol 
over the expansi ve desire. 3ut reason alone oannot impose 
thi S re straint. This wus Pla to T s fallaoy. I'~ei the:!:' oan the 
lowel' or ord.inary will restriot itself. Yet, together, these 
exhaust the nature of man, "rational animality.!T So, Babbitt 
eonolud.es) (and. !,Ieroie:...' appla\lds), the higher power must be 
from without, must be d.ivine. 52 1;11an, as professor Meroier 
puts it, is not merely a rational animal, but a rational 
animal plus this di vine something. And. he .triumphantly oon-
elud.es that 1.11'. Babbitt has established, on purely positiv-
,-------------------------------------------. 
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is tic grounds, the existence in man of a 5upernatural some-
tl1in~ akin to the Christian's graoe o:f Qod. 53 
Wi th all respeot to Professor :.Iercier, we must protest 
tw.t }le is going too svviftly. On Mercier's own statement,54 
no t to oall on Babbitt himself', the la tter d.o es not d.eolare 
ei ther for or against th e e:criste!1oe of God. because a o.eolara-
tion either vrd.Y VJould. be unpositivistic. To deolare the 
pre senoe wi thin man of a divine power, while refusing to com-
mit oneself on the existence of the souroe of such a power, 
is somewhat di sconoerting. The argument agai.:'lst such pro ce-
d.ure is that of Sacra tes against :;:.Iiletus. rrhe extr'avaganoe 
of tllis assumption is manifest in the light philosophy throvJs 
on the time relation of will and. intellect,and Babbitt's 
arbitrary limitG.tion of the word rrreason ff , of 'whioh we shall 
speak, holo.s muoh of the explanation for the whole question. 
The diffioulties into which Babbitt is led by reoall-
ing Joubert's assertion that i1lusion is an integral part of 
man's life are not ended. Granting the power of control as 
he sees it, let us reoall that he is oareful to oaution its 
intelligent use, its use, as beoomes evio.ent, in acooro.ance 
with some intelleotual norm. Suoh a norm, to be effective at 
all, must be universal in character. A measure which is use-
less, save in a particular eBse, is not a norm but an ecaen-
tricity. Babbitt conoedes this. But his theory of knowled.ge 
precludes our grasping universal essence, the essence of good-
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;S8SS or righteousness, for example. It preoludes these uni ve 
( sal norms and, unless some' expedient be found, condemns us to 
L sterility in the fruit of the "Higher Will." Babbitt thinks 
,: 
, to have found an esoape in the very element of illusion. "The 
solution lies in the right use of illusion. n55 
At this point in his exposition he eQuates the term 
"illusion" and. "imagination" in a very oonfusing manner. 56 
AS a natter of faot, they cannot be equated at all if we aim 
;.' ; at any accuracy. Illusion d.enotes d.eception of the subject; 
~> 
" ~': the object is not there; at least, is not there just as he 
r 
thinks he peroeives it. In the aotivi ty of the imagination, 
however, one is perfectly certain, under normal cond.i tions, 
that all is a mere representation. Obviously, illusion oannqt 
be what Babbitt means, and realizing the implications of the 
word he shifts to the word "imagination" as more or less oom-
monly understood in the actual elaboration of his i&6&. 
Since imagination is to do the work usually asoribed 
to intelLeot, we may expeot to find. strange powers attributed 
to it. And we do. The norms for the exercise of the "Higher 
Will" must be universal, at least flexible so, that is, they 
must fuse into a unity the oommon element in the multiplioity 
of experienoe. Reason, E!B.ys Babbitt, sinoe it can grasp only 
the inti vidual, is tied down to the many and must give way to 
the imagination in virtue of the unifying power he asoribes 
to the latter. 57 He is oareful to distinguish the kind of 
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,lJIlagim tion he means: the ethioal imagination, whioh may be 
fa.ef'ined briefly as the olassioa.l or seleotive imagination oon-
~ 
" centra ted. on th e human law. It is opposed to the romantio( or 
'expansive and sensuous) imagination and is oharaoterized. by a 
power to deteot similari ty and d1 versi ty and. to unify or 
: synthesize similars, not into an absolute universal, out into 
':- a standard, an em 0 odime n t of th e no rmal t in th e sen se 0 f the 
~ representative or loosely generio. Nothing is said of the 
'power to determine whether the na ture of the similarity ue 
accidental or essential or merely apparent. Concentrated on 
the universal experience of rr:a.nkind., this power will peroeive 
, the similar, norrral pre nomena., and ga the ring them int 0 flexi-
ble unity, will provide a oonvenien t norm for tle exeroise of 
the "Higher Will". It is the duty of reason, by virtue of 
r.~ its analytic pov/er. to determine the immediate applioation of 
, this norm in the present contingenoy.58 
, 
<. It would appear that Babbitt, besid.es presenting an 
oocasion for a vast amount of misinterpretation, must also 
Lebe acoused of degrading the intelleot inexousably. Uuoh of 
the diffi oul ty spring s fro m an unwarranted restri ot ion of the 
word "reason. n Certainly, we possess the unifying power of 
! whioh he speaks, or at least one very like it; and his des-
oription oorresponds to what is aa.lled, in critioism, the 
ftoreative imagination." This, however, must be d.elicately 
'defined. But to d.eal with trreason" first. It is a mistaken 
,: 
opposition he wculd discover between reason and the classioal 
f l""gination as analytio and unifying powers respeotively, for 
on what grounds can it be justifie;d? Certainly not on the 
r" ground: of experienoe nor on that ot sound. terminology. 
r 
~' Reason, as designating the int elleotu.al elemen t whioh speoi-
,,' 
1 
fies man, has alve.ys mea.nt)not only tIm analytic powerjwhich 
Babbitt would. concede to it,! but also that complementary power 
of synthesis which is an essential faotor in intellectual 
progress. Babbitt reoognizes that man has the power of 
,,' synthesis. But he is oonstrained by his own definition to 
deny that it is the work of reason. Forced to look elsewhere t 
he is led by the quality of "oreative n imagination whioh 
charaoterizes the world's great works of art to seize upon 
imaginati on as the faoul ty of synthesis. 59 
The phrase "creative imagination")as used in artistio 
criticism;needs careful attention. Do oritics mean by it to 
asoribe to the imagination as such, the unifying, purpose-
giving, directive power implied in the term lIcreative"? I 
think not. Those of th e Aris"OO telian sohool, from Ari sto tle 
to Father L nghaye, oould not do so Without great inconsi~ 
tency. The imagination is essentially the power of repre-
senting sensi ble objects independently of their presence. 
As such, its unifying power consists in the ability to repre-
sent in one image o'ojects wholly distinct. The numbers, one 
~. two., three, four, (1, 2, 3, 4, ) written Side 'oy side, are 
CertainlY really distinot. 
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The imagination, nevertheless, 
,all represent the image of the number, one thousand two hun-
dred and thirty-four, onoe the integers are peroeived. Fur-
> ther, it oan give unity of suggestive sucoession, o'ne image 
following upon another acoording to some connection~whether 
in the manner or time or degree of intensity of' other oir-
cumstances of antecedent sense peroeption. To .unify into a 
l, congruouS, and even a synthetical and oeautifu~ whole, would 
~ seem to be beyond the imagination and to demand a higher 
~ 
1', directive power. This higher directive power is none other' 
than the intellect in its synthetic oapaoity. By it we se-
lect, unify, ooordina te and direot the repre senta tions of the 
imagination. By its operation the landsoape artist, from the 
panorama of nature, ohooses those partioular details which 
" are sui table to the impression he wishes to emphasize and 
rejects the less effective, giving unity, purpose and meaning 
/ to what else were but detached and irrelevant details. It 
" 
enables Homer, from the multifarious det~ils of a scene of 
departure, to select and unify inCidents, attitudes, moments, 
which make the sailing of Ulysses from the land of .A.lkinoos 
one of the most touohing love soenes in all literature. It 
is by the intellectual element at work that the imagination 
of the great poet, composer or painter is lifted from the 
level of mere representation to the exalted. plane of artistio 
I' area tion. 60 
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Little would be lost if. while misnaming this power, 
;; bbi tt would yet by its agency achieve his end. This is 
beoause the ethioal imagination can aohieve no 
eniversals based on the essenoes of things. Even though it 
i_ould 80llate the experienoe of the past into a ftstandard lf 
rOf ethical oonduct, thi s would be found wanting. Babbitt 
f. 
:.sserts that the worth of any standard must be measurable by 
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:haPpiness, in other words, in terms of the good. But we 
L ~:lIUst know the good in its essenoe before we oan begin to use 
t • .. 
r:lt as a measure by whioh to evaluate a stand'lrd of life; p . 
". . l~'otherwise we are measuring the unknown -by the undefined. The 
\:. 
~ experienoe of the past cannot give us this knowledge; nor 
(. 
~.'oes he ooncede to the: individual intellect power to gra.sp it • 
• I~:~ 
He limits our knowledge to the individual, the immediately 
~ 
;(perceptiDle; to this good thing, to that happy moment. Happi-
ness and goodness must foraver elude us. It is this denial 
" 
.i whioh vitiates his final ideal, de o o rum , or moderation, into 
;\'moral opportunism, for he turns from the metaphysioal to the 
! ethioal prOblem, while the latter can only be dealt with in 
. the light of our solution as to the former. , 
This will oeoome olearer if we examine his use of the 
:: word "happiness. n The ul tina te ori tarion, to whioh tm ethi-
e&l induotionist is to have reoourse in the evaluation of 
"experienoe, is the fruit it bas borne, and willoear if prop-
erly applied, in happiness. 62 Is it not apparent that upon 
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:tbB essential understanding of this word, plaoed in tl:e key 
(poSi tion of the stru.otu.re. the soundness of the whole edifioe 
, d ? ;4epen s. Yet Babbitt admits, at least implicitly, that we 
;, "an never grasp this indispensable faotor. For happiness is 
~.a universal essenoe. It does not mean a happy moment nor an 
t objeot whioh can give happiness; it is limited neither to the 
" 
I' individual nor to the i:nmediately peroeptible. It designates 
I" t:' 
'that very reality whioh is at the heart of every happy moment, 
~ and of every objeot that aan give happiness and whioh, oon-
. 
~ sidered in its universality, is applioable to every individual 
:;~ and yet remains a unity. Only thus can it beoome a valid 
norm. And. oonsidered thus it oannot be identified with the 
individual nor lend itself to immediate peroeption. These 
last are the very conditions ~bbitt imposes upon oognition 
•. and, as a oonsequenoe, he deolares unknowa-ole the very cri te-
: rion in the light of which we are to pass judgment on the 
worth of past experienoe. The "ethioal imagination" oan offer 
but sweeping generalizations as to what, in the past, seems 
to have led people to a oondition whioh seems to have oeen 
happiness. ~ut we can never know. 
Babbitt speaks frequently of the qualitative differ-
enoe between happ iness and pleasure. .tlut hi s denial of abso-
lute universals handioaps him herebeoause the 6..istinotion 
',SOught must be based on a knowledge of the nature of goodness, 
'!the quality oommon to happiness and pleasure. If the pleasant 
;' 
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in some sense, goodness, yet in a sense different from 
'1;ha t in which it may be predioa ted of happiness, the only 
.olution is to push back to the universal id.ea of goodness. 
"plAoing its specific note in suitability, we can validly dis-
'unguish a greater and a lesser, a true and an apparent good, 
,'on a basis of the dignity of the faoul ty to which they are 
.• suitable. That whioh beCOl:leS a common end or a total nature 
can be said to be a greater good than one that satisfies some 
.~ pa.rticular end or some individual faoulty. Happiness may be 
designated as the possession of that good whioh oecomes man's 
> rational nature in its entirety, oonsidered in all its aspects 
and relations; pleasure, as oomplaoenoy in the satisfaotion 
of any partioular power. The universal is the basiS of the 
distinction; its denial involves oonfusion. 63 
Considered in the light of these remarks, I think, the 
ideal of Cheoorum as proposed by Babbitt loses its original 
appeal. Not that it is to be utterly repudiated as worthless. 
It is merely insuffioient. It promises happiness upon modera-
tion without pretending to tell us what hap?iness is, or why 
•• mo d.era ti on is' the way to it. "To be a hu.rnani s t , n he says, 
"is to be moderate, sensiule, deoent. ft64 But is this happi-
:-.. ness? To pull back impulse to a vague and tenuous prop or-
tionateness, in the light of an indefinable goal, is oertainly 
unsatisfaotory. The whole ideal laoks oompelling foroe. This 
compelling foroe, whioh should rest upon a grasp of the nature 
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f things, is naturally lacking in a system in which the 
:~'poVier to know nature5is denied us. In Babbitt's plan, our 
,.]t!lowledge is limited to the individual precei ved through a 
lyeil of illusion. As a consequence we are urged to relinquish 
i;aspirations toward the universal, the absolute, the meta-
!, -
,. !: physical, and to confine our efforts' to practicc:.l Questions 
~iof conduct. nut to solve these, some norm of oneness, of 
universality is needed. Since an absolute is denied, we are 
! offered "standards" which are nothing more than generaliza-
tions of instances, making no pretense of plumbing things to 
their depths. 
These standards are worth just what any hypothesis is 
worth until it is seen to be grounded in the nature of things. 
They may be convenient, and expedient; they may fit certain 
conditions and explain oertain data. But here they stop • 
. Any other hypothesis whioh fulfills the se requirements, even 
though it be oontradictory, is quite as valid. There is 
nothing in either of the~ to compel acoeptanoe. Babbitt sees 
this, of oourse, and weloomes the fact. This laok of oompell-
ing foroe, he would oounter, insures that flexibility of 
standards which is so neoessary for the ori tical modern mind 
, and the inviolability of the individual. As a matter of faot, 
the laok of compelling force in moral standards leads to 
moral relativism, pragmatism, subjeotivism; anything but real-
lsm. It leaves room, not merely for the, play of indi vidua.li ty, 
•• for caprioe, Little is gatnedb1' the appeal to the ab8o-
~.e of pa8t e%perienoe.. strauge oOllllusions can thus be 
~wn from the past, and, in s:>me R7, twisted into plau8ibil-
1 
-.t1es• 
To erreot a sound system of ethios we must sound the 
.. tu.re of thihga. Until we oa.n say of any moral standara that 
~t rests upon man's natu.re ad.equate17 oonsidered. that is, in 
f,tself and in its relation to God and other oreature., there i. 
taothiDg to compel the individual to aocept it as a norm for hi. 
f .. n oonduot. This 1s not ,to say, of oourse, that the oom-
~"Julsion to be moral oome8 direotly from the valid1 t1' of a norm. 
r,,' 
~lUch compulsion is laid upon as creature., conformably to the 
t .. oe s si t1' 0 f our na tare. by the Crea t1lr. The unwr1 tten laws 
~of heaven are graven in the na1nlre of things, of God, of man 
;and of creation. ili !he oonstants of experienoe are manife.ta-
~ t10ns of that nature and oonstant. beoause that nature i. neb. 
'1 
"as it is. 
To cose to this we must r.~ogn1ze the fUll range of 
, un's 1ntelleot upon realit7. Babbitt's initial error lies 
o here;'.ing his stand with positivism he falls w1th 1t, and 
i<\ 
:h18 ethioal house of carda oomes tuabling after. Yet, 1fi thalJ 
there is .-o.oll a.eserving ot praise and aooeptance in wha 1; he 
.... ught. 
III 
!h1s statement IB\lst appear alaost paradoxioal ooming, 
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it does, after what may have appeared to be purely de-
otive comment. The only justifioation which oan be offer-
ed is tha t th& oomment offered is based on sound principles, 
wb.i ch wake, of course, no olaim to originality. Soundness of 
philosophiC principles is far more desirable than originality. 
The oommenda tion now to be bestowed is entirely sinoere and 
oan easily be suostantia ted fro m Hr. Babbitt's wri tings. 
Let us begin at the beginning and take our stand with 
on the faot of experience whioh he deems absolutely 
. tu,ndarnental; tha immediate peroeption, in the individual, of 
·0 element anterior and superior to thought and feeling, 
whioh manifests itself, practioally, as a power of oontrol. 
shall presoind, for the moment, from the nature of this 
. power) (which we considered a.bove).1 to fix our attention on the 
position it holds in Babbitt's scheme of things. Ultimately, 
.. tJ::e assertion of the pre sence 0 f the power is a re-&ssertion 
of dualism in man, a fumbling re-assertion and, as Dr. Bandas 
: )oints out, 66 inadequate, but a re-assertion, nevertheless, 
i1,and. one tha t is made at a cri tioal moment. Vie are at the 
high tide of naturalism. We have seen its fruits, and since 
r'they are evil, we condemn the tree which bore them, to be out 
~<4.own and ca.st into the flame. No more vi tal point at whioh 
, 
(to lay the axe could have been ohosen than that at which 
t,,. 
~:.Babbi tt strikes in the re-assertion of this basic fact. 
" 
(Jatumlism, he demonstrated, tends to level things off, to 
i 
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'degrade man to a mere' part ot nature and.. to dany that war in 
the oave between expansive desire and direotive oontrol whioh 
is the surest mark of his superiority. The faot of this 
oonfliot t whether it be oonoeiTed as the effect of original 
sin or merely as innate moral indolenoe t is at the base of 
true ethios. From naturalism's denial of this oonfliot there 
have followed principles most corrosive and destructive of all 
morality. Among the more widespread of these principles we 
. may name the tenet that man is naturally good, in the sense 
tba t when following tm promptings of his nature he will 
always and neoessarily do good; that all elemental promptings 
are ne~essarily good; that life must be unified by a oomplete 
i~ 
'. surrender to instinct. The denial of this confliot gave rise 
t to the myth of pre-conventional s implici ty and spon tanei ty t 
i at pre-social inoorruption; to the exaltation of pity, and 
the exaggeration of the fraternal instinot as oapable ot 
oounteracting the urge to self-ag:,~randizemen t. This same 
. denial lies at the root of all that is objectionable, as 
;j being sentimental and false to rea.li ty, in al truism and hu-
manitarianism. Upon it rests that individualism of unre~ 
, atraint and moral indif:ference whioh is sapping tre vigor of 
r.lour generation. The ory of naturalism is that of Chateau-
sbriand1 s CllB.otas: ttperisse 1e Dieu qui contrarie la nature,ff 
:;1f we but understand God as being any prinoip1e of restrio-
't10n and control. 67 What could be nobler or worthier ot our 
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,eomplete aooeptanoe than the re-a,ssertion of tre, vital faot 
-of this oonfliot? And Babbitt does just that, with a personal 
conviotion and a oourageous disregard of parsaaal popularity 
, tha.t shed a glow, almost of heroism, about his name. Pro-
fessor Mercier's tribute finds a wide eoho: nYle my disagree, 
but we oannot disregard; and, even in disagreeing, we cannot 
, but ad;nire th e courage of his stand. u68 And we may a.dd, its 
kt fundamental so lidi ty. 
Within this dualism is oontained another of the most 
~ praiseworthy and promising pOints of Babbitt's oree4-, the 
i II "~'!igher WilI. Not that his via of this power oan be accepted 
.' unconditionally. I think we made that olear. .dut the signif-
ioance of the assertion of suoh a power oannot be overestimat-
ed. As Babbitt oonoeived it, the Higher Will is essentially 
free c~nd supra me in th e individual. 1>-:oreover, in la'Doring to 
- eeta blish its presenoe he has a,l\\liYs argued from experiential 
'~, grounds. Thus t in the Higher Will, he has forged a wea.pon 
; with which to attaok the tfunmora,liststf on their own ground. 
The~qast claim to have freed man, on scientific grounds, from 
the moral responsioilities attaching to free will. Babbitt 
: olaims to have establisre a., soientifioally , that r!Son is fully 
,responsiole fer. his life and. conduot. 
The gospel of the essential goodness of man as the 
,sentimental naturalist preaches it also aims at the oomplete 
liberation from moral responsibility. But the claims of the 
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i.cientific apos tles of oehaviorism and mechanism seem~ even 
]J1ore plausible to the oritioo.l, self-as'sured "modern .lind." 
!hey have, onoiological grounds, sought to reduoe men to a 
';JIlere oomplexity of ohemical and physioal interaotions, ruled 
l 
:.bY laws over whioh he has no control, indeed, of many of whioh 
he is still ignorant, and which work inexorable vengeanoe 
--upon tho se who hinder th eir free operation. Abso lute moral 
, 1rresponsibili ty is held out in the name of the se physical 
i and ohemical laws. In the name of these laws the meohanist 
~ ani psyohoanalyst preaoh nemesis upon control in terms of 
-repression complexes" and Itinhioi tions." They claim to pro-
~. pound thi s 1i bera ting do ctrine from the solid platform of 
scientific experiment. To all such the "Higher Will" of Pro-
fessor Babbitt spells oonfusion, for it is based, as well as 
the rest of their olaims, not on authority or revelation or 
. tradition, but on irrmediate expErience. They would free man 
. from moral resp8nsibility on a positivistio rejeotion of its 
(only basis, free will. In the name of the Higher Will, the 
r: 
f presenoe of which he labors to establish on a ba.sis of similar ~ 
'f" 
i 
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"
'against degradation to the level of the brute. 
: A noted writer of our day enumerates, among the obar-
r acteristios of our age. irreverence for the past. This may 
I' 
r, be applied with speoial emphasis and. justioe to Amerioa.. Hany 
t'1nfluenoes have been at work to form this attitude in us. 
, our very na tional birth is a symbol of this spiri t. We were 
\' brought forth in a struggle to shake off a lfforeign Jf domina-
tion, and with it went muoh it would have been to our profit 
~ to retain. Our natural resouroes, which have made us the 
,~l 
'riohest of nations, lave also gone far toward naking us the 
'most oontemptuous of the aohievements of other nations, espe-
:'oially in the past; and the orass materialism of the oiviliza-
tion we have developed has trained us to look upon suoh finer 
; and nobler achievements of the past as the arts, philosophy, r 
! 
~;and the fruits of culture generally, as incidental interests 
~1n life wholly suoordina. te to the supreme "business of man. 
,,' 
~;lIhiCh. we were told. oonsisted in industrial enterprise and 
;',conomio expansion. 
~, 
'i, Against thi s orude frontier spiri t Babbitt launohe s a 
powerful and pointed attack, plaoing at the base of his 
~ .• thioal struoture reverenoe and respeot for the past. From 
;lts experienoe we are to draw our standards of the normal, 
:zoepresenta.tive. and oentral in life. It is not to form a 
~ckground merely, cast against which the aohievements of 
': 
age maysta.nd out more boldly, but is to supply the. very 
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ding stones of the rrnewft ethios, to furnish the vital 
our da.ily lives. the norms by which we measure. 
since the experienoe of the past is preserved am en-
works of art and philosophy which have oome 
to us, it is only oy assiduous study of these precious 
itages, ,that we oan draw from tl'em vital influenoe and 
ishmen t from our own day. To turn to the pa.. st for stand-
s means a return to all that is finer and nobler in life, 
achievement which transoends materia.l greatness, to works 
whioh still live on when onoe belching smokestaoks will 
. survive only as blaok and d.esolate monuments of a misguided 
. 
. oulture. It means a turning to the inner spirit from the 
outer din, to reason from sophistry, to an evaluation of life 
acoording to its permanent elements r.ather than by the prog-
ress stages of a ohange-mad age.. There are oome as M. 
Maritain, 69 who oannot agree to a parity oetween the heritage 
and wisdom of East and West. Thare is a greater oleavaee 
between the East and the West than riabbitt seemed to peroeive, 
such objectors would insist. 1~oreovert tiE special olaims of 
Christianity make it impossible for us to turn to any tradi-
tion other than that of the West which has recognized these 
claims. We cannot push aside the olaims of Christiani tYj we 
must examine them as they are put forward. For the phil-
osophio thought of the West seems to soar muoh closer to 
reality, and Christianity. sinoe its olaims are demonstrated 
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CHAPTER III 
PLA.TO AND THE JUSTICE OF THE INNER MAN 
The Republio, so patently a work of supreme artistry 
and touohing in its vast scheme a world of varied topics, 
displays as many facts as a shapely gem, each of which casts 
back the light with its own peculiar lustre and attraots with 
a beauty proper to itself. The personality one feels brea th-
ing through every line of delicate poniard-like irony. of 
ardent oensure, or of lofty aspiration, is enough to draw one 
back to the book again and again. To the historian, whether 
of literature or philosophy the insight it affords into the 
ethos of the time, though indireot, is invaluable. The rhet-
orician and stylist finds, in the rich and varied melody of 
its language, in the congwnmate skill of the dialogue, in the 
vivid narration, in the delioately. suggestive and oolorful 
imagery, and in the subtle argumentation, an inexhaustible 
treasure-house of beautiful thought and beautiful speech. 
To the student of PlatoniC thought it stands as the sun in 
tm constellation of his dialogues, for it is, in the vords 
of Paul Shorey,l "a positive, not to say dogmatic, exposition 
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Plato's thought." From this point of view there stand out 
from the multitude of questions raised, but not always an-
two dominant lines of inquiry, the twofold quest for 
in the individual and justice in the state. 
Much ink has been spilled since the time of Proclus 
in a somewhat futile discussion of the respective importance 
.f these themes. Did Plato mean primarily to elaborate the 
1d.al state and only inoidentally the individual just man, or 
oonv.rsely, first the individual and then the state, as his 
words would seem to indioate?2 Proclus held the latter view, 
acoording to professor Shorey,3 while in reoent t~.s so 
.minent a soholar as Professor Jowett,' although designating 
Plato as above all an ethical psyohologist, devotes his in-
troductory essay to a consideration of the Republic almost 
.xolusively from the first point of view. This seems to be 
the more oammon view today5 owing perhaps, as Daniel Sargent 
suggests, to our interest aDl faith in sooiology whioh makes 
a lodestone of every utopia. As we might suspect, in snch 
a case, the truest view seems to be the one which reoonoiles 
rather than opposes the two oontentions. Indeed, the view 
'xpressed by shorey6 and, long before by Zeller, is far more 
in keeping with Plato's spirit. Zeller's wards are:? "For 
the Greek, ethios and politics were closely bound up with 
each other. As long as the Polis existed, it was quite im-
POssible to think of the individual as separate from the eom-
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rnunity.n 
The questions were, quite possible, of equal im-
portanoe to Plato's mind, first, beoause he was a Greek and, 
seoondly, beoause at the time of writing Athens was running 
a oourse to whioh he oould not be indifferent, and the So-
phists were preaohing an individualism that he oould scaroely 
let pass unohallenged. Is it at all remarkable that in the 
Republio, nthe central work of Plato's maturity,n8 these two 
questions should oome to the fore, not on an equal plane 
merely, but inextrioably intertwined, as, to the Greek mind, 
they seemed necessarily to be? The important thing for this 
investigation is that Plato aotually desired to delineate, in 
some way, an ideal of development and oonduot for the individ-
ual, and this is not diffieult to demonstrate from the text 
itself. 
It has been remarked above that in Plato humanism is 
an inmanent quality; this is so, literally, and the word can-
not be truly pred~ed of his dootrine until this faot is 
reoognized. Humanism, it has been said, is basioally the 
desire to glorify human nature. This interpretation is not 
oonolusive, for the term admits of' several legitimate inter-
pretations. There are those who would glorify human nature, 
as Jorgensen says, by making it the aome of all perfeotion. 
This is not humanism, but pride; better, pitiful blindness. 
There are those who would glorify h~ nature by yielding 
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to what is highest in it the plaoe of pre-eminence and domin-
ion. Only these really love human nature. Only these are 
exempt from Leon Bloyts scathing denunoiation of that love of 
mankind which longs for its damnation and seeks to bring it 
about. Among these humanists Plato must emphatically be num-
berered, in virtue of that native and burning aspiration whioh 
breaks through subtilty, irony, and humor to crystallize in 
such phrases as nNo man is willingly deceived about that whioh 
is the truest and highest in himselt. n9 This is the humanism 
of Plato: the highest in man must be made the rock upon which 
his happiness is to be built. 
I 
The theme ot the Rep~blio is an investigation into 
the nature ot human justice. But it is by no means a tree 
inquiry. The conviction, (or shall we say intuition?) that 
whatever justioe may be it must have its ultimate explanation 
in man's nature, and not in anything less fundamental, under-
lies the whole ot Socrates' disoourse. Man!! just before he 
acts justly. Even more, the whole ot the first great division 
-
of the dialoguelO is devoted to establish~ this point ot 
View, both negatively and positively, and in this light the 
doctrine set forth becomes a protest against the superfi-
ciality characteristic of mere traditionalism and half-skep-
tical pragmatism. 
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The negative assertion o~ Plato's oonviotion takes 
the form or a refutation of these two dootrines. The first 
definition o~ Justioe brought forward rests almost wholly on 
tradi tional teaching, and great effeot is gained by putting 
it into the mouth or the young Polemarchus, who has Just re-
ceived it verbatim rrom his elder. Justioetl maintains 
polemarohus on the authority of the poets and sages of the 
pastJmeans giving every man his due, good to a friend and 
evil to an enemy. This is shown to be a weak and an inade-
quate definition because it admits of oontingenoies in which 
anything but Justioe would result from its applioation. To 
do evil to an enemy, Soorates argues, would be to injure him 
in just that quality whereby he is a man. Suoh oannot be the 
effeot of true Justioe. The poets could never have meant thi 
The seoond objeotionable doctr1ne,l2 for which Plato seleots 
a worthy mouthpiece, is dealt with in a similar manner. 
Justioe, fulminates Thrasymaohus, is the interest of the 
stronger. How naive, thinks Soorates. Cannot even the stro 
er mistake his own interest? Where is justioe then? Thrasy-
maohns is pressed to admit a similarity between justioe and 
the praotioal arts. l3 If Justioe i8 similar to a praotical 
art, reasons Socrates, like, let us say, the art of medioine, 
whioh oonsists in a oertain aptitude and skilfulness in 
aohieving an end, must it not like ~ery other praotical art 
serve the subjeot or reoipient of its aotion prinoipally? 
or, does Thrasymachus believe that the primary object of 
medicine is the fattening of the doctor's purse? 
During this discussion Socrates has oeen gradually 
gathering certain positive statements relating to his own 
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view of justice by admissions gently extorted from his oppo-
nents. Justioe is the distinctively human virtuej14 it is an 
immanent quality by which man attains the end of his nature. 15 
It dwells always with wisdom and goodness. 16 It is to a 
large extent, or perhaps entirely, the determinant of real 
haPpiness .17 
Finally, in the speeches of Glaucon and Adeimantus,18 
the point of inquiry is definitely fixed. After a thorough 
and an eloquent disoussion, the view of those who plaoe 
justice in acts and its real worth in something beyond itself 
and maintain tha t justice is only the result of a convention 
among men, is rejected as inadequate and untrue to fact. 
Justice, every reasonable man knows, is desirable for itself 
as well as for the peace it brings. Therefore an adequate 
definition must not rest with a description but must plumb 
the nature of justioe. Socrates, in his own mOlok-humble' 
fashion, reluotantly consents to undertake the investigation. 
No mention of the state has occurred thus far. It 
1s brought in at this junoture as an aid to the investigation 
of the nature of ,justi oe • Since justi oe is a ttri bu ted to 
States and individuals alike, suggests Socrates,19 would it 
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!lot be advisable to study its nature in the larger unit first) 
as being the -same tale writ larger-? Then the findings oould 
be applied to the individual. No aotual state can serve as an 
example, sinoe it is the ideal stat. alone of whioh justioe 
oaD be predioated without qualifications. One must oonsequen 
11 be oonstruoted to order, so to say, and Soorates prooeeds 
to do so (inoidentally, on a basis of expedienoy and mutual 
profit). The polities about him, nevertheless, furnish many 
. 
of the details of the ideal state. This aooount of the origin 
of states, oommentators hasten to inform us, is not intended 
to be historioal. There is no need for this oaution. We are 
not so naive as to believe this. Nor, do we think, was 
Plato. 
The prinoiple of the division of labor is the root 
prinoiple of Soorates' polity.20 This prinoiple rests on the 
natural insuffioienoy of any man to provide for all the needs 
of existenoe, strengthened by the faot that one man is more 
SUited by nature for a given task than another. The fruits 
of labor, oonsequently, are multiplied ani perfeoted by the 
entire devotion of the worker to the task for whioh nature 
has best fitted him. So men oame together to form a polity 
for mutual profit. 2l The prooess of evolution on this prin-
oiple is carried by Soorates from the Simple, loose union for 
the satisfaotion of the barest needs ar life to a oomplex 
and olosely knit organization for the attainment of the 
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fU,llest possible life. The finished state, though oomplex in 
struoture, is one in purpose. Its end is the true happiness 
of the whole. 
st~oturally, the state is oomposed of three olasses. 
The number and oharaoter of these is determined by the needs 
of the state on the principle enunciated. Eaoh olass is 
charaoterized by a more or lesa distinotive virtue. The 
lowest am by far the most numerous is that of the artisans 
and produoers. 22 Under this head are olassed all gainful 
ocoupations, namely the protessions and the trades. The 
second olass, that of the warriors, is oomposed or fighting 
men, endowed by nature With courage and physical prowess. 23 
Its raison d1 atre as a political unit is the need of pro-
teoting the produoers, and also to effect desirable expansion 
of territory. The smallest and highest olass is that of the 
ru.lers. 24 
The rulers, too, are endowed by nature for their 
task and holt! power in virtue ot this endowment. Even more, 
the virtue of the whole state derives from them in a definite 
manner. The virtue proper to the rulers is Wisdom in counsel, 
consisting above all in a knowledge ot both the greatest good 
of the whole and the means of attaining it. The oourage ot 
the warriors depends upon this wisdom of the ~lers beoause 
it is, striotly speaking. the oourage to detend the truths 
handed down by the rulers as requisites and oonditions for 
l----------------~ 
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the happiness of the whole. Without this direction the 
oourage of the warriors would be but rashness or the ex:a lta-
tion of mere brutish superiority, No proper virtue is pred-
icated of the class of artisans, but they are conoeded a 
share in the temperance whichmmu14 charaoterize all the 
olasses in all their aotions. Thus three of the cardinal 
virtues, which are charaoteristio of both state and individual, 
are aocounted far. But what of justioe? Where does it dwell 
in this fair state? Not in any particular class, but in the 
mutual harmony25 among all olasses which is sure to follow 
upon each one's tending to its own affairs and in no way 
intruding upon those of another. Let each olass, working 
upon its proper level, seek earnestly the virtue and happiness 
of the whol., and justice will have here a lasting abode. 
Considered from the point of view of the separate olasses, 
justice might be called the virtue by whioh eaoh is enabled 
to keep its proper plaoe; from the point of view of the body 
politic, as a whole, justice might be said to oonsist in the 
internal harmony of the socialelements. 
The applioation of all this to the individual j though 
expressed as tentative, is oomplete,and exact. 26 Justice of 
the individual, too, is found to be an internal harmony or 
poise, which come s as the result of proper suOordina tion and 
oooperation among the elements of the soul. Of these Plato 
distinguishes three, oorresponding in nature and proper 
l-. ------------------------------------~ 
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virtues to the olasses of the sta.te. The least noble is the 
multipliOity of desires we all experienoe, rooted in the nat-
ural tendenoy of every power to complete satisfaotion. 27 This 
Plato oalls the conoupisoent element, and its only virtue is 
the temperanoe to whioh it is disciplined by reason. The 
spirited element,28 fount of so many generous impulses and 
that seat of oanrage in man, is far nobler. But it too derives 
its true nobility from the allegianoe it pays to reason. 
Reason,29 or intelligenoe, sits godlike in the highest tower 
of the soul, ruling all else in virtue of its knowledge of 
the good of the whole, and the mea.ns of its attainment. It is 
the sun of individual existence, dispensing, as an effluence 
of its veing,light and virtue to all the soul. When reason, 
in virtue of its superior knowledge, rules the activity of 
the other elements, duly subordinated, there arises in the 
soul true justice, the justice of the inner man,30 of which 
that other justice, predioated of the state, is but a shadow. 
He in whose soul this sweet concord reigns, is indeed the true 
philosopher, "the lover of the vision of truth." 
In the ideal of the individual, Plato does not rest 
with a general explanation of the knowledge which gives reason 
1ts superiority. T~e philosopher is distinguished from other 
men not only in that he knows more, but beoause his knowledge 
is of a higher order and pieroes to greater truth. The su-
premaoy of reason, in the full sense of the phrase, rests 
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upon a grasp of the fundamental prinoiple of existenoe and 
experienoe under its most absolute and unified form. The 
philosopher knows the ultimate knowable and he knows it as it 
The distinotive quality of the philosopher's knowledge 
is universality.31 This does not mean that he knows every-
thing as an aooumulation of faots; it means that he grasps 
the unities or essenoes beneath the multiplioity of experienoe 
and, ultimately, the real unity, the ultimate essenoe of all 
things. This is the real meaning of the puzzling line Plato 
uses to illustrate graphically the grades or qual1 tie's ot 
knowledge. 32 It 1s to be observed that 'eaoh step upward, or 
to the right, (acoording as the line is represented vertioally 
or horizontallY)J1s a step away from the physioal, oonorete 
many toward the abstraot, universal one. 33 Eaoh suoceeding 
level of knowledge is oonsidered truer as it is more absolute, 
universal, and independent of physioal reality as reported by 
the senses. The asoent 1s relentlessly maintained until the 
"eye of the soul" is brought to bear fUll upon the ultimate 
reali ty , the ideal of go od. 34 
The idea of good is the proper objeot of "nous." In 
grasping this, man grasps the key to the universe, for in 
1tself it oontains the sum ot· all things. Its attributes and 
funotions exhaust reality, and these Plato draws out in im-
pressive array. 
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Primarily, it is the real or ultimate objeot of all 
desire. It is found upon refleotion and analysis, that the 
true objeots of desire are not the many whioh present them-
selves immediately to experienoe, but an absolute perceived, 
no matter how dimly, behind them all. No reasonable man out 
will answer, upon being interrogated, that he seeks this or 
that objeot beoause it oontains some partiole of, or shares 
in, some universal quality. He seeks this beautiful objeot 
beoause it is a tangible aspeot o~ beauty whioh his soul seeks 
as something desirable and snitable to itself. So it will 
be found to be with all other objeots of desire: they are 
sought for a universal quality they share. Even in these 
uni versals, the super-universal or transoendent quality of' 
desirableness, suitability, is the real objeot of desire. 
Goodness, as this desirability is rightly oalled, in its 
purity is oonsequently the real objeot of all desire. people 
whose knowledge pieroes no farther than the report of 'sense 
ever seek goodness under the manifold aspeot it wears to 
sense. The philosopher, transoending by the aotion of "nous" 
the realm of sense-life, seeks goodness in its purity.35 
This very trait leads us to see how the seoond funo-
tion of the idea of good can truly be predioated of it. The 
idea of good, says Plato, is the determinant of the usefulness 
and value of all other things.36 Sinoe we seek goodness it-
self in all, the use and value of all, in regard to the 
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attainment of pure goodness, will naturally and normally come 
to be determined by the share they have in pure goodness or 
by their intrinsiC approximation to it. Thus the idea of 
good is the determining factor of use and value fundamentally. 
yet, Plato goes on, how can we tell how olosely any particular 
participates in or approximates pure goodness if we have no 
idea of what pure goodness might be? Thus the idea of good 
beoomes a determinant in this respeot, formally. Only the 
philosopher knows the idea of good, only the philosophe; 
consequentlYj knows the rea.l use and value of life. 
It is far more difficult to peroeive wbat was in 
Plato's mind when he wrote that the good was author of being 
and essenoe 7:"0 E'ivtlJ/ 'l K"'i rn'y oJ(f't~v-, of all things. 37 
J 
To interpret his brief statement to mean that the goodness 
or sui tabili ty of the essenoe of any thing to tha t thing is 
the basiS of its reality would be reading too muoh into ~is 
words. This same interpretation might more clearly be stated 
thus: unless the essenoe of a thing was suitable to, or good 
for that thing, the thing oould never be a reality. It would, 
in other wordS, be a contradiotion of notes, and oonsequently 
nothing. This interpretation sounds dreadfully li~e the 
schoolman's ooncept of' intrinsio possi bili ty, whioh oonsi sts 
formally in a non-repugnanoe of notae oonstitutivae. Inviting 
as this may seem, it is far better to pass it over and oandid-
ly admit that this idea in Plato is obsoUre. The statement 
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stands. however. The good is the author of being and essenoe. 
From this it follows quite easily that the good is 
also the author,although indireotly, of intelligibility and 
knoWledge.38 A thing is knowable conterminously with its 
reality or being, since obviously we cannot know nothing. 
~he soul, moreover, is said to know when it is in conformity 
with that whioh is, or as Plato says, ftwhen resting upon that 
on which truth and being shine. ft In regard to all else its 
oondition is one of unoertainty, for the mind is determined by 
reality or being. 
From all this it oan readily be seen that the good 
is the prinoiple of order in the universe. It is not itself 
that order, but imparts it. The philosopher who has grasped 
the good has obtained what Cardinal Meroier says is the aim 
of all philosophy, "a complete grasp of the universe,ft in the 
light of a higher reality. It must not oe supposed that the 
good is desirable as the pr1noiple of order. It 1s des1rable 
f~ itself alone. Be1ng most manifest 1n that order, however, 
it follows that the most immediate means ot attain1ng the 
good is by a grasp of th1s order, and oonform1ty to 1t. To 
know one's plaoe and keep 1t 1s a oonstant theme in Plato. 
But one more aspect needs oonsideration before the 
ideal 1s oomplete. It is the divine element 1n both the 1dea 
ot good and the 1ntelleot "nous." The word "d1vine" as 
applied to anything in Plato is a treaoherous term and one 
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careful handling lest it confute what it is thought 
to sustain. This is so beoause Plato uses the term so fre-
I \ q,uently, and., frequently, so vaguely. As the Abbe Dies said, 
.ith pardonable impatience, -Tout est divine chez ce trop 
divine Platon." The most orthodox of oommentators39 seem to 
agree that the word is certainly to be predicated both of 
reason and 0 f the idea of good. In the case 0 f the former 
there is actual textual support. -Noue" is that portion of 
man's soul which alone is created directly by the Supreme 
God himself, and is therefore itself also, divine and im-
mortal. 40 Moreover, the presenoe of this divine element is 
the distlnctlve mark of mankind. 4l ~he argument for pre-
dicating divinity of the idea of good is not quite so simple. 
It is a oonclusion which follows upon various statements and 
ciroumstanoes. ~hat the idea of good is divine seems to 
follow upon its similarity to the Creator in the Timaeus. 42 
Divinity establishes the link between the books of the Repub-
lic as a fulflllmen t of the doctrine of the goodness of" God 
-
prescribed in the treatment of the eduoation of the young. 
"Now we have already seen that the 
preliminary soheme of education was intended 
to pave the way for the. later and more ad-
vanoed, by inoulcating in a categoriC or 
dogmatio form, as it were, the refleotion of 
philosophio truths whioh are afterwards to be 
apprehended in themselves by ratiooination 
and not by faith. It would acoordingly seem 
that the Idea of Good, is the philosophio 
fulfilment of the dootrine of divine goodness 
already imparted at an earlier stage of de-
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velopment. 43 
Lastly, there is the ar~unent from book ten (597b),44 and the 
divinity asoribed to "nous",45 whioh last, as Adam notes, 
makes the separation of religio~ and philosophy impossible. 
It is not diffioult to understand the new oharaoter 
given the ideal by this oonsideration. The divinity of the 
faculty of knowledge makes the quest for the truth a religious 
aspiration. The divinity of the idea of good makes its pos-
session a religiou~as well as intelleotual,fulfilment, and 
validates the fusing of the intelleotual and ascetio or 
religious elements in Plato's thought. Its divinity also 
makes the asoent to the realm of being a religious ascent or 
conversion. We oan now grasp more fully the meaning of the 
phrase applied to the philosopher, that he is, "the lover of 
the vision of truth." "Lover" designates the religious ele-
ment in the philosophio oharaoter. The statement that the 
divine "nous;' having :for its proper ob,jeot the divine idea of 
good, is the distinotive mark of man46 stamps the ideal as 
humanistio in a far higher sense than usually understood 
today. To be a humanist in this sense is to be true to the 
very highest in man and to the highest beyond him, God. 
II 
The laounae within the Platonio system and the failure 
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of the system, as a whole, to oope adequately with the faots 
of experienoe upon whioh ph1losophy must be based, have been 
the subjects at treatment learned and elaborate enough to 
conv1ot further disoussions on our part of fut1lity. and even 
of impertinenoe. But even a superf10ial oonsideration of the 
1deal of individual perfection whioh we have gleaned from 
Plato's writings, may not pass over unnotioed certain points 
1n whioh this ideal fails to satisfy all the expeotations we 
might justly entertain of an adequate ideal. We Shall not go 
beyond the limits of the ideal itself, and to oonsider its 
weak points will but serve to throw into greater relief 1ts 
many sound and noble aspects. 
~e most arresting inadequacy in the ideal is the 
failure to aooount for free will. The nexus is drawn im-
mediately between knowledge, (a 'very certain kind of know-
ledge, to be sure) and justioe, the distinotive human virtue. 
Justioe, acoording to Plato, will come to dwell in the soul 
when reason, the organ of the highest knowledge, is supreme. 
The cave myth illustrates this.47 !he ascent from the cave 
describes figuratively the passage from imperfect to perfect 
knowledge. With the attainment of perfeot knowledge - in-
( "" I /1"-' telleotual peroeption of the good, VOn(T't 5 rtJt.i ala. (;It) ~ Justioe 
will take up its abode in the soul as a neoessary oonoomitant. 
Conversely, we may oonolude that where Justice does not dwell, 
ignoranoe holds sway_ Perhaps this direot linking of know-
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ledge and virtue has the advantage of eliminating the knotty 
problem of the interrelations of will and intellect. To 
neglect the will, however, is to leave unaecounted for the 
most potent force in human nature. The price of the relief 
gained by Plato's theory is too great. 
It may seem a St1ffioient explanation to say that 
Plato inherited this theory from his master Socrates, and 
this is a true explanation to some extent. Philosophically, 
however, it is to be traoed to his conoeption of pure good-
ness as the object of desire. The object of deSire, he tells 
us, is not any partiaular modified object, but a pure quality 
or substanoe. The objeot of' thirst48 is not a 0001 drink, 
nor a warm drink, but just drink. ~he modifioations depend 
on oircumstanoes extrinsio to thirst. The ultimate desidera-
tum of all desire is always pure goodness which is sought 
under all oircumstances. 
If this is granted him Plato's stand is irrefragable. 
It oannot be denied that the will is not free in regard to 
pure goodness, (bonum ~ !!!,) in soholastio terminology. If 
pure goodness be the real object of deSire, then the will is 
mmply determined. Only let the intelleot indioate pure good-
ness and the will at once will grasp it. If man wills aught 
else, it may logically be said that he does so thro~h igno-
ranoe. Exoeption must be taken to Plato's fundamental pos-
tu.la te. 
,-----------------------------------------------------------------, 
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It oannot be said without great qualifioation that 
the objeot of the will is pure goodness. Considered in the 
abstraot,the human will is determined toward goodness as suoh. 
In the oonorete~the objeot of volition is always some good 
thing. The aotual exeroise of volitional power is always in 
the oonorete. In the conorete, goodness beoomes various. An 
objeot may be a real or an apparent good; again, it may be a 
rational. useful, or a pleasurable good. Among these the will 
has a freedom of ohoioe. These forms of good are not, of 
oourse. mutually exclusive altogetm.r. With full knowledge, 
the will may ohoose the apparent J in preferenoe to the true, 
or a merely pleasurableJin preferenoe to a rational good. 
Its ohoioe is always made, of cours~ sub ratione boni. We 
sometimes speak ot an abstraot quality as the objeot ot 
deSire, as when we say that someone always seeks his own 
oonvenienoe. Analysis shows this to mean that he wishes every 
Single thing to 'oe to his oonvenience. In exeroising its 
power of ohoioe tb:l w111 is norma.lly under the direotion, not 
oompulsion, of the intellect. We mention nothing more than 
the' taot of the will f s freedan. The influenoe ot oiroumstanoe 
and other factors upon the exeroise of freedom, is anothe.r 
question. As a oonsequenoe of freedom of the will virtue 
must depend not on a knowledge, but on the deliberate ohoioe 
of the highe st a otual go ode 49 
Attempts have been made to explain away this diffioul-
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tyof the will In Plato's ideal, by an interpretation of the 
nEt tU.re of tlE. knowledge the posse sSion of whioh, Pla to 
thought, resulted in virtue. -Noesis," the knowledge proper 
to the philosopher, it has been explained,means a perception 
of reality so clear, so penetrating, so illuminating, as to 
leave no shadow of doubt in the mind, and consequently, no 
hesitation in the will. It is a faot of human experience, 
however, that no mere intelleotual peroeption oan of itself 
determine the will. If this is denied the freedom of the will 
disappears. No clarity of intelleotual perception oan oompel 
the will. It may be probable, at times highly probable that, 
granted a pure intention, the man who knows the truth will 
ohoose it. But we ha.ve nothing more than probability, ante-
oedent probability as Cardinal Newman would say. Returning 
to Plato himself, however, it is difficult to see how his 
writings give any real support to the interpretation of 
"noesisu as a knowledge so olear as to overwhelm the will and 
render it incapable of an erroneous ohoice. The state upon 
which justioe will follow, aooording to Plato, is no more than 
one of unolouded certitude as to the ultimate reality of 
things. Though Unous" itself is said to be divine, no ex-
ternal suuernatural influence is oonceived to act upon it. 
It is the· intellect working on its natural plane. Conse-
quently we can only say that his theory fails to satisfy 
&dequa tely the faots of experience. 
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Plato's oonception of pure goodness as the objeot of 
desire naturally leads us to consider his attitude toward sen 
knowledge. In his description of the philosopher's knowledge, 
.noesis~ the proper ooject ot which is the idea of good, Plato 
says that it is a state of pure intelligence entirely free 
from the influence of sense. 50 The question pOintedly stated 
is: What value does Plato ascribe to sense knowledge? Does 
he conceive of the universal ideas as abstracted from data of 
sense or as directly peroeived by the mind and independently 
of sense? 
In answer to the first question, we must say that 
Plato asoribed to the senses their fUll due. They put us into 
contact, he says, with the individual material objeot as it 
manifests itself to them, individually and colleotively.5l 
No more and no less can be justly ascribed them. Plato Simply 
rejeoted t~ir testimony as insufticient to the needs of the 
soul. The real objeot of desire is pure goodness, of which 
the senses tell us nothing. Therefore, the soul oannot oommit 
itself to their incom p e tent guidance. 
To say that the senses can give us no concept of es-
senoes is not to say that we can in no way have knowledge ot 
universals. Plato reoognizes tha taot that we have universal 
ideas. But it is a diftioult step trom the individual, mate-
rial report of sense to the universal, spiritual idea. In 
seeking to aocount for the universal, Plato devised a soheme 
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in which abstraction, i.e., the disengaging of the universal 
essence from the individuals o~ sense experience by an opera-
tion of intellect, has no place. The intellect, as he con-
ceived it, had immediate perception of the universal. To 
aocount ~dequately for the universal, he devised the whole 
platonic ontology. The abstraotion of Aristotle and of the 
schoolmen solves the problem of universals just as it pre-
sented itself to Plato, without falling into his exoesses. 
The relevancy of this epistomologioal difficulty to 
the integri ty and validi ty of the ideal of perfecti. on is 
obvious. Had Plato not been mistaken in regard to the mind's 
power of abstraotion he would have esoaped ma.ny errors whioh 
impair the perfection of the ideal. Goodness as the real 
obJeot of desire, the self-existence of universals, the 
negleot of free will, etc., would have been avoided. 
No little perplexity is oaused the reader by Plato's 
disoonoerting use of the word ~divine.~ This is espeoially 
true of the applicati~n of this word to anous.a When he 
uses the term (or its equivalents), in oonneotion with the 
idea of good, VIe are not surprised. His whole line of dis-
Qussion J the funotions and attributes asoribed to the idea of 
good, its relations to all reality, has been leading toward 
suoh a predioation. When he applies the term to unous,· 
however, his basic argument is unoonvinoing. ~ous," argues 
Plato, is the only portion of tha soul directly oreated by 
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the highe st God, and therefore ~ itself immo rtal and di vine~2 
The inference d.oe s no t follow. If it did, we should have to 
argue that the human soul, which 1s directly and individually 
oreated, (as Christian thought teaches), is divine. 
From another angle, however, it is not difficult to 
see how Plato came to make this predioation. The ti~e in 
which he lived, as we have already remarked, was one of 
transition. Plato oame definitely to rejeot .the old theology. 
This does not mean oy any means that he failed to reoognize th 
religious element in man. Plato was too great a realist to 
make this egregious error. As Zeller puts the matter: 
"The Platonic ethios, like the SooratiO, 
is based absolutely on the autonomy of reason 
and is thus far completely independent of 
religion, that is, at least of the religion 
ourrent at that time:- Yet pratob~ ethics is 
'based ona reIigI'Q'Ii7 - his ovm." 
Plato reoognized the essential place of religion in man's 
nature, and the divini ty of the idea of good and of "nons" is 
his provision for this essential need. The theory whioh seeks 
to explain the divinity of Tfnou~" and the idea of good as a 
ooncession to popular prejudioe in favor of religion show.s how 
little its elaborators oaught Plato's spirit. There is no 
diplomaoy in Plato where truth is oonoerned. The divinity 
of the idea of good replaoes the old anthropomorphio gods. 
The divinity of "nous" replaoes the old worship of fear and 
pro~itiation with a warship of knowledge and virtue. But why 
must any portion of the soul be itself divine? The answer 
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lies in the autonomy Plato ascribes to "nous," the divine 
element. "Nous" by its own power has direot perception of 
the divine idea of good. The element of man's nature thus 
able to perceive the divine has about it something of di vini-
ty. Plato conceived of the relation of "nous" to the idea or 
good as the attraction of like to like. If Professor Adam is 
correct in saying that the Timaeus is nothing but an elucida-
tion of the function of effioient cause, asoribed to the 
supreme idea in the Republic,54 the partioular oreation of 
"noue" by the highest God55 would follow as the natural ex-
planation of why "nous" alone oan directly pe~ceive the good. 
The divine origin of "nous" and its power to know the idea 
of good thus form oomplementary aspects ot this element ot 
the soul. 
But the greatest diffioulty raised by the divinity at 
"nous, ff as far as the perfeotion of the ethical ideal is 
oonoerned, is yet to come. The divine "nous," says Plato, is 
the distinotive mark of man's humanity.56 At first glance 
this is simply baffling. How can a divine element in man's 
nature mark him distinotively as human? The answer seems to 
be that Plato appears to have reoognized what may be called 
the Sllpernatura.l potency of human nature. 
This supernatural potenoy or capaoity oonsists, ac-
oording to soholastic philosophy, in this, that God can 
enable human nature to perform supernatural aots without 
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~iolating human nature. Q.ui te the 00 ntrary , human na. ture by 
its essenoe lends itself to snoh elevation, whioh becomesJas 
a oonsequeno~ an intensifioation of the distinotive human 
57 acts. Plato, of oourse, did not conoei ve anything as olear 
ani definite as this doctrine evolved by the Sohoolman work-
ing twelve centuries after the Incarnation and with the nega-
tive guidanoe of theology to prevent their falling into many 
errors. Plato does, nevertheless, seem to have hit the es-
sential faot, tmt human nature is oa.pablte in sane way, eitbar 
of asoending or being lifted to a greater proximity to the 
divine, and of aoting conformably to such elevation or ascent, 
not only without violation of its essenoe, but with an aoore-
tion of dignity and power. He oversteps the mark, however, 
when he posits in man's nature some oonstituent that is es-
sentially divine. This does threaten the humanity. The ex-
aggeration is quite understandable, but this truth .!! clear: 
Man's very essenoe is sufficient reason for his oapaoity of 
being elevated to a supernatural plane of action. 
Eaoh of the difficulties we have discussed presents 
a distinot obstaole to the aooeptance or Plato's ideal as it 
stands. Colleotively, they are fairly representative of the 
errors of Pla tonism. Nevertheless, they do not dim the splen-
dor of the truths enshrined in the idea.l of the "philosopher. 1f 
Balanoed against eaoh other, the truth of the ideal. will be 
found far to outweigh the error. Fairness to Plato requires 
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tba tat least a briet review ot the points ot merit in his 
ideal be attempted. 
III 
The epistemological dittioultybrought out above is 
of a deiioate nature. It concerns what is reoognized as the 
most dittioult question in epistemology - that ot universals. 
Plato's method ot handling the matter ditters trom the methods 
ot all modern schools, exoept soholastioism) in that he does 
not tamper with the universal idea. He never oalled into 
question the aptitude ot the mind to know reality as it is. 
The universals, to his mind. have objeotive validity, and in 
seeking to account tor their presenoe in the mind he holds 
intaot the prinoiple of sufficient reason. We know the 
essences of things, w. have metaphysical certitude. This 
one point alone manifests ampl7 his vast ~periority to most 
modern thinkers and oontains his message for them. 
His stand upon universals is ot vast importanoe to 
the ethioal ideal. As we have seen in the oase of Babbitt, 
when the validity of the universal is impugned the only al-
ternative for the ethioal positivist is to attempt a solution 
of the problem of oonduot without metaphysios. The acceptance 
of this alternative would destroy ethics as a sCienoe, robbing 
its oonolusions of all oompelling foroe and rendering its 
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terminology devoid ot meaning. Plato's ideal ot life is 
based on reality as he sees it. Every aspect of the ideal is 
aocounted for by an appeal to the nature ot man, of other 
oreatures, ot God. fhe problem ot oonduot is attaoked in the 
light of metaphysics. 
The appeal to metaphysics is apparent from the begin-
ning of the inquiry into the nature of justice. In response 
to Glaucon's request that justice be defended on the grounds 
of its intrinsic worth, Socrates suggests that the quest for 
the nature of justioe be undertaken. He pursues the quest 
first by a psyohologioal study of man in which he seeks the 
hidden springs ot human aotivity. In evolving the theory ot 
the tri-elemental soul Plato is preparing a way for a defini-
tion of justioe ot which it may be said, "This is true justioe 
because man is what he is." A oonsideration of the nature 
of man, however, cannot be carried on without reference to 
reality about him. Consequently. Plato is led to touch upon 
all reality, since it influenoes man. Here, too, there is no 
hesitation about man's ability to know the essence of things. 
Plato definitely states that the nature of reality beyond man 
is suoh and SQoh. The definite character of man's relation 
to reality beyond him is determined by his own nature and the 
nature of that reality. Of oourse, to inquire into Plato's 
conception of the nature of God and the physical universe is 
beyond our soope here. We have tried to consider all the 
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matter th&t referred immediately to the ethical ideal. The 
point to be made is that Plato definitely establishes his 
definition of Justice on what he believes to be the nature of 
things, in other words, on a metaphysical basis. 
The importance of this fact for the value of the ideal 
can scaroely be overestimated. It imparts to the ideal ohar-
acter of the philosopher that stability and solidity, that 
finality and oompelling force without which it would be but 
another fine-spun theory. Because it rests on this basiS, 
the ideal leaves no loophole of escape for a subtle and 
elusive individualism, more acourately, caprice. The in-
dividualism it fosters is one of stern responsibility. The 
only conolusion to be drawn from a sincere examination of the 
ideal is: ttlf this be true, if these be the facts, then I 
must live up to this norm, lest my own life be frustrated of 
its highest end. n The only valid ground upon which the ideal 
can be attacked is to say that it deals inadequately with the 
nature o~ things as these manifest themselves to experience. 
This is the ground upon which succeeding philosophers have 
rejected it, not entirely, but only as a final solution to the 
ethical problem. They have acoepted its many truths and 
sought, in the light of reflexion, to sapply its omissions 
and rectify its errors. Even for the Christian the ideal 
holds muoh of value, not as something beyond what the Chris-
tis.n ideal possesses, but as a powerful presentation of such 
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< 80 
t~~th as is oommon to both Platonio and Christian thought. 
The metaphysical basis of the Platonio ideal of human 
perfeotion makes it diffioult for suoh writers as Norman 
Foerster58 to substantiate the olaim that their thought is 
the genuine progeny of Platonism. The autonomy of the inner 
authori ty whioh they preaoh differs vastly from the Platonio 
autonomy of reason. The latter is based on the ability of 
reason to know the nature of things; the former, on a diffi-
denoe in the power of man to know things as they are, either 
his own nature or realit,y beyond him. Plato wanted the fount 
of moral aotion to De the ordered interior of the individual, 
and its ohiefest reward~, peace and righteousness of soul. 
But he never olaimed that the satisfied oonsoienoe is any-
thing more than a manifestation of oonformity to the nature 
of things. Conscienoe neither oreates nor ultimately ratifies 
the essential reotitude or depravity of human aotions. In 
partioular oases, it is true, even a mistaken oonsoienoe (pro-
vided one does not know that it is mistaken) is to be follow-
ed, in the event tha. t no other souroe of" informa tion is to be 
had. The obligation to follow even a mistaken oonsoienoe, 
however, does not oonoern the intrinsio morality of the aot, 
but only the disposition of tha agent. A mistaken oonsoienoe 
is no measure by whioh to form general norms. The untainted 
oonsoienoe is a witness and expression of the law of man's 
nature and derives all its binding force from this souroe. 
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The ideal of the philosopher presents the true hu-
manistic dualism most clearly. We suggested in our introduo-
tion that ordered power as opposed to indiscriminate intensity 
is the humanistio ideal of action. Babbitt's ethical ideal 
illustrates this; so too does that of p~re Longhaye, as we 
shall see; but neither, so clearly as that of Plato. 
To understand how this is true, it will be best to 
follow the genesis of the dualism of Plato's ethical ideal. 
We must turn aside for a moment to View, sketchily of course, 
the dualism of the PbaedQ. Here we find the condemned 
Socrates insisting on a dualism between body and soul whioh 
1'1 .... in some aspeots approaches the CTW,AA.c:4 cr'YJ ~cJ.. dootrine of 
the Orphios. 59 The body is depioted as the great obstacle to 
the life of philosophy, and death welcomed as deliverance 
from this impediment. We oannot understand the real advanoe 
over the Orphio ideas, oontained in the dualism ot the Phaedo, 
unless we note several pOints of Socrates' stand. First, as 
Paul Blmer More says,GO even here as early as the Phaedo 
Plato did not. mean by "body" merely the flesh, but the entire 
host of blind unreasoning desires of whioh man is oonsoious. 
Indeed, in the Phaedo these desires are assooiated most 
closely wi th the flesh. But Plato was gradually drawing away 
from this association. paul Elmer More is justified, in 
saying that the intense asceticism of the Phaedo is but a 
passing phase of Plato's thought. This view is verified in 
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the dualism of the Republis. The seoond point to be notioed 
is the introduotion of knowledge into the idea of dualism. 
The body is the great hindranoe to knowledge, and freedom 
from its thralldom will en~ble the soul to attain true wisdom. 
Lastly, we must notioe that the oharges preferred against the 
body are based upon a preferenoe for unity and control in 
life as opposed to the multiplioity and looseness of organiza-
tion charaoteristio of the life of the senses. The desires 
assooiated with the flesh are many, inter-oonflioting, in-
satiable; the desire of the soul, one and all-su1'i.ioing. The 
senses can give but contaot with the reality of partioulars; 
the knowledge whioh the soul needs is unified and universal. 
We shall see these points finally developed and olarified in 
the RepuDlio. 
The new and generous appreciation of the body is 
perhaps the most striking point of the dualism of the Republio 
as oom9ared with that of the Phaedo. It is not too much to 
say that the opposition to the flesh as suoh has oomple tely 
disappeared. Plato no longer looks upon the body as a prison 
and an impediment, but as a positive aid to the soul in its 
ascent to fulness of life. In the system of education he 
sketohes, gymnastios, whioh is to train the body to harmony, 
graoe and proportion, not for its own sake, but for the soul, 
holds an important plaoe. The proper disposition of the body 
oan prepare the way for the soul's ascent, and the physioal 
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harmony of the body beoomes an image and refleotion of the 
harmony of the soul. From oPPosition Plato turns to eoopera-
tion. 6l He has eome to realize that the flesh as suoh is 
capable of no evil. Eaoh faoulty, in tending relentlessly 
roward satisfaotion, is but folloWing the law of nature. Who 
shall reprove the eye with seeing? To gain unity in life 
the soul must not seek to escape the body but must itself 
unify life by the exeroise of oontrol and direotion over the 
activity of the whole man. 
Consequently) in the Republic the struggle is no longer 
between body and soul, but within the soul itself, between the 
rational and oonoupisoent elements. The aim of this oonfliot 
is to reduce the oonoupisoent element to submission to reason, 
and not to exterminate desire. The oontrol whioh reason is 
to exeroise over desire is emphatically not a mere curb or 
inhibiting influence, as Paul ~lmer More would have it,62 
but a direotive and coordinating foroe as well. Limitation 
of aotivity, whether by preference of one power to another or 
by restraint of the intensity of the aotivity of a single 
faoulty, is oertainly a part of oontrol; but it is a minor 
part, since the normal activity of the whole man is necessary 
for happiness. 
In the Republio, however, we find no ohange in Plato's 
attitude toward the soul and the senses as organs of know-
ledge. The dualism of knowledge and opinion in the Republio 
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oarries on the similar opposition of the Phaedo. The solution 
of the problem of universal ideas and sense-knowledge leaves 
reason autonomous in its perception of essence. The knowledge 
of the senses is not repudiated as false, but as insuf:ricent. 
The knowledge of the autonomous reason is preferred oecause 
of it s uni versali ty and certi tude, the necessary conditions 
for unity and control in lite. 
It is clear from this, that the real dualism, to 
Plato's mind, exists not between body and soulJor between 
reason and desire wi thin the soul, but between uni ty and 
control, as opposed to multiplicity and unrestraint, in life. 
Consequently, the elements of man's nature are conceived as 
opposed to one another as they make either for unity and 
control or multiplicity and unrestraint: reason is opposed 
to desire, the soul to the body, "nous" to the sensesJas uni-
fying powers to elements which tend to di~ion and unre-
straint. The philosophic character is built about the idea 
of order in power, the core ot humanism. 
Although Plato's rather importunate introduction of 
divinity into the scheme may cause some readers annoyance, 
we must reoognize this insistence as his constant testimony 
to the fact that religion is an essential element in man's 
nature and must oe accounted for in any adequate ethics. The 
ethical ideal Plato envisaged was a state of perfection for 
man conformable to his nature, and religion must have a cen-
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tral plaoe in the ideal. He oould not oountenanoe the tradi-
tional religion of his day, so he settled the matter as he 
thought it must be settled. His solution, in its detail, is 
unsatisfaotory. Ii we oonsider the oircumstances under which 
he labored, his ideal on the whole needs little apology. The 
point to be emphasized is that he realized the need o~ relig-
ion in life and sought to give it its rightful plaoe. How 
this can be.said to impugn the humanity of his ideal, it is 
difficult to see. On the oontrary, the ideal becomes more 
human because of the p1aoe given the divine. It acoounts 
more fully fo r the faots of our nature than any ideal whioh 
ignores religion in the name of humanity. Certainly, if the 
basic motive force behind all humanism De the desire to re-
alize all the potenCies of human nature, Plato deserves a 
place almost without peer among the truest humanists. The 
nan who sets out to erect a "humanistic" ethics without God, 
religion and the supernatura163 is Simply using words reck-
lessly and, what is worse, misinterpreting human nature reck-
lessly. We do not mean to say, of~ ~ourseJ that Plato entertain-
ed any idea of the supernatural ideal of life as Christian 
revelation discloses it to mankind. But he emphatioally did 
not preclude it from among the possibility of man's nature. 
On the contrary, as we noted above, the predication of divin-
ity of "nous" ma, even be legitimately interpreted to mean 
that Plato reoognized in an obsoure way the basic apptitude 
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of man's distinctive power, reason, to act on a higher level 
than the natural plane of its aotivity. And to recognize this 
power in man is to ~ecognize the natur.al basiS for the super-
natural, the factor that makes' the supernatural truly an 
elevation and not a substi tution of human nature. An ideal 
which deliberately exoludes this power from among those of 
man's nature has no more right to olaim the title nhuman" in 
the full significance of the word. 
Even though we cannot acoept Plato's ideal as it 
stands, we must reoognize its worth and nobility. It refuted 
the sophistry of his day; it is an answer of more than two-
thousand years standing to the sophistry of our own times. 
Aldous Huxley64 and his class are confounded before they speak 
for' one who knows the PlatoniC ideal. So too, is Walter 
pater. 65 And the reckless use of "PlatoniC" to designate 
every vapid idealistic nostrum for the ills of humanity, is 
one of the long standing injustices in the history of human 
thought. 
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CHAPTER IV 
GEORGES LOJ::TGHAYE 
.AND THE IDEAL OF CHRISTIAN HOMAIH5¥ 
The remark of Frank Jewett Mather, Jr., that a re-
ligion whioh is a mere appendage to a system of ethios is 
little worthy of the name and that a virile Christianity 
ooulQ dispense with humanism, holds much truth and an equal 
amount of error. l Both the truth and the error of the remark 
spring from his u.se of the word "humanism. n He uses this 
word only as it is applioable to the Amerioan humanism of our 
own day. Henoe his conoeption of humanism as an independent, 
self-subsisting ethical system; henoe, too, the truth of the 
remark about religion as a mere appendage to suoh a system. 
Indeed, it is just the kind of humanism which sets up an in-
dependent moral ideal and oode that Christianity oan, rather 
must, dispense with; Christianity has its ethics. The error 
of the remark lies in rilather's tacit assumption that his use 
of the word exhausts its meaning; so, oy declaring Christi-
anity above or beyond this humanism he implies (and elsewhere 
states explicitly) that it is irreeoncilable with the very 
notion of humanism. Nothing could be more mistaken. Chris-
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tian humanism is a fact, an ideal which lives today. 
Christian humanism has as legitimate a title to the 
anpellation as any other claimant. Even more, it more per-
fectly realizes the common aim of all humanism: an ideal of 
life which realizes man's proper perfection. This is true 
even if we accepted Bremond's opinion that the radical note of 
all humanism is the glorification of human nature. The glory 
Cl'ristian humanism ascribes to human .na ture is the glory God 
Himself ascribes to it. Christian Hurne.nism desires the 
blossoming of all the ~otencies of man to the perfection God 
intended in creating man. 
This is the humanism represented by the author we are 
about to study: Georges Longhaye, of the Society of Jesus. 
While almost our contemporary, he is the direct descendant 
in thought and ideals of culture of the long line of Chris-
tian humanists from Da Feltre through Salmeron, Ledesma and 
Richome, and has guarded intact his heritage, even adding to 
it from the riches of his own personality and experience. 
The ideal he represents in his life and in his writings may be 
summed up briefly as that of the cultured Christian leading 
the life of faith to the full. 
It may seem remarkable that so apparently unpromising 
a title for our purpose as the "Belles-Lettres" has been 
chosen from among Longhaye's.volumes. In what way, one might 
ask, does it enshrine the ethical ideal of Christian h1.lman-
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ism? The answer is not far to seek. It lies in Longha.ye' s 
basic conception of literature. The literary art, to his 
mind, is "l'art d'exercer sur l'homme par la parole une 
aotion morale, puissan 1e et ordon~e. n2 We know from the teach-
ing of philosophy that an effect never exceeds its cause, 
and that a cause always produces an effect "sui simile. n It 
is not otherwise in literature. The moral effect produced 
will be as the moral stature of the cause. It is the man 
behind the word that makes literature. Unless we pierce 
through the letter to the man we can never grasp more than 
surfaoe truth. A knowledge of an author's view of life and 
man is neoessary for a true grasp of his work. "La clef de 
tout system litteraire est l'id6e m&me qJon si fait de 
l'homme. n3 ~!any besides Longhaye will grant this, partly. 
But few will go with him to the logioal conolusion. Since 
the ideal of human life and conduot is one and universal in 
its moral aspeots, only one type of man can write truly great 
literature, the man whose life realizes or approximates the 
true ideal. So, Longhaye rightly maintainS, to study liter-
ature is to study man, and to ereot, philosophioally, a liter-
ary ideal is to oonoern oneself necessarily with the moral 
ideal of life. 4 The Belles-Lettr~ is, above all, philo-
sophioal. Its aim is the ereotion, or better the disoover~ 
of the true ideal of literature. It is necessarily conoerned, 
consequently t with a moral id eal of life, and this ideal is 
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the ideal of the Christian humanist. 
Indeed, the elaboration of this ideal is not so com-
plete as we might wish. But the deficiency is amply com-
pensated by Longhaye's statement that the principles under-
lying all his thought are those of the scholB.stio, and espe-
oially Thomistic, philosophy,5 and the teaching of the Catho-
lic Church. Drawing on these souroes we may hope to bring 
the ideal to satisfactory fullness. 
Morality, writes Father Longhaye,6 is the regulation 
of the free aots of man toward his last end. Within the 
compass of this short sentenoe is paoked the whole philosophio 
basis of the ideal of human life and oonduot whioh stands 
behind the Belles-Lettres. Its analysis is all that is neoes-
sary to the elaboration of that ideal. In prefaoe, however, 
we may remark that the strong point of the ideal is the oog-
nizanoe it takes of man's nature. It is not designed for 
human nature, but deduoed from it, as it manifests itself 
upon philosophio refleotion. The ideal is realistio in the 
best sense of that muoh abused term, that is to say,it is 
based on the truth of things as they are. This aooounts for 
the two notes most oharaoteristio of the ideal. By thus sink-
ing its foundation to the bed rook of human nature it is made 
impregnable to every attaok save a negation of the oonoeption 
of human nature upon whioh it rests. There is no question of 
detail here. If the natare of man is what sound philosophy 
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teaohes it to be, all that follows logioally must be granted. 
The issue is essentially philosophioal. Moreover, this ideal 
oombines the statio and dynamio elements of life, for it is 
at onoe a metaphysio, (that is, based on metaphysios) and a 
disoipline. 
The term, "last end" (fin derniere) may well serve as 
the point of departure in the analysis of this definition. 
The faot that all aotivity is teleologioal is a datum of 
universal experienoe.' The bird which appears among us in 
due season, and, seleoting the proper crotch in the proper 
tree, proceeds with unerring instinct to gather just the 
proper material needed for its own kind of nest, is an exampLe 
common enough to bring the fact home clearly to everyone. 
A similar phenomenon greets the biologist in his laboratory. 
The teleologioal natllre of embryonic development is a marvel 
of preoision and unerring ooordination of parts to a oommon 
end when the aotivity of development is normal. It is in 
itself a devastating oonfutation of meohanistic and tropistio 
theories. Inanimate nature shares this oharaoteristio, as 
sCienoe shows. But it is most apparent in the human act, 
because man is conscious of this aspect of his nature. 
Indeed, we may state unequivocally that aotivity 
manifests intelligence. The intelleot which guides action 
need not be present in the agent, but is always connected 
wi th the agent by the positive influenoe whioh exists be'tween 
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the oause and its proper efteot. This maybe illustrated by 
the example ot the diverse aotivities in man. The human body 
obeys all the ohemioal and physi oal laws of life, not by the 
deliberate choioe of the individual, but instinctively, nat-
urally, because God so oonstruoted it. The intelligenoe be-
hind its aotivity is the Divine Intelligenoe guiding, so to 
speak, the oreative divine will. So, too throughout nature 
aotivity proclaims the existence of Divine Intelligenoe. Man 
has another field of activity, however, over whioh he himselt 
exercises dominion in virtue ot free will. He mayor may not 
do oertain things, and the intelligenoe whioh iwnediately 
guides his ohoioe is his own. The proper human aotions are 
deliberate and oonsoious, that is, man knows the end of the 
aotion and his o~ power ot self-determination in regard to 
it. 
This consciousness of purpo se and freed.om is the 
specific difference between the aoti vi ty of man and that of 
all other oreatures and places man in a sphere peouliar to 
himself. When the bird builds its nest, and the seasons 
change, the activity is oarried on in blind ooedienoe to an 
imnlanted nature, and for an end unknown to the bird or to 
the elements. They cannot do otherwise; their aotivity de-
serves neither praise nor blame; their aotivity is oomplete 
and perfeot in the fulfilment ot the immediate end. In the 
distinotive human aot, however, the reverse is the case: the 
9'1 
aotivit7 inherently deserves reward or punishment; the end of 
the distinotively human faoulties, will and intellect, is 
never merely immediate, but also ultimate. That is to say, 
.an is responsible for his aotions; and the intelleot and will 
are truly frustrated unless they serve the ultimate purpose 
o! the whole. Man must, at least in the last analysis, aot 
toward an ultimate and human end, an end beyond which there is 
nothing and which is eminently suited to human nature. 
The necessity of so acting is imposed upon him by his 
nature t which, beoause it is 1mmutable, God Himself cannot 
change. 8 Because man is intelligent he oannot rest Short 
o! the ultimate good of" his nature; because he is free, he 
is responsible for the attainment of that good. Reflection 
shows him that in every action he is drawn to act by the de-
sire to obtain or effect something which he apprehends as 
suitable to himself. It also shows him that the good of the 
whole is imperative even tor the proper satisfaction of the 
part, oecause a part, from its very nature, cannot thrive 
truly and permanently if the whole is frustrated of its 
end. So the element of disorimination is introduced into 
human activity. The man who follows reason will not rush 
headlong to the attainment or effecting of everything which 
elioits his action, but will aSk whether the satisfaction 
of the instant and the part will advance or hinder the perma-
nent satisfaction of the whole; and conversely, thus consider-
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ing, he will envisage more and more olearly a good whioh will 
at onoe satisfy the whole, as a whole and in every part. His 
mind peroeives the infinite and ultimate good. And his will, 
limitless in its hunger for the good, follows after. Onoe 
this ultimate good is perceived it must be willed. "We needs 
must love the highest when we see it." And like Guinevere, 
man blinds himself, or everts his attention to oontent him-
self with anything less, at the oost of inevitable frustration 
and woe. 9 That this ultimate end must be human, in the sense 
that it eminently befits human nature as filling and satisfy-
ing its tendencies and capacities, is obvious. Effort toward 
any lesser end is repugnant to reason. 
The conclusion that man's activity must be directed 
to an ultimate end whioh is the fulfilment of his whole nature 
opens up the further question of the nature of the last end 
itself. This new question presents two avenues of approach, 
the subjeotive and the objective. lO What can the nature of 
man, studied in itself, tell us of what his last end must De? 
What light can facts external to man throw upon this matter? 
Let us try to follow these leads in turn. 
The question of the nature of man's last end is the 
Simplest and most subtle that can present itself to the human 
mind. Any ohild, any savage, any SIlper-oultured devotee of 
all the muses will agree in the simple response, ttRappiness." 
Every philosopher has been drawn to this as to the ultimate 
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question of his sCienoe, and many a fair philosophio bark has 
gone to pieoes on the reefs which lurk beneath the apparently 
quiet waters of this inquiry. Happiness is indeed the answer. 
AS Pascal says: "L'hormne veut ~tre heureux, et ne veut etre 
quI heureux, et ne peut ne vouloir pas l'~tre." But this 
answer only deepens the question. 
The main implioation of the word "happiness" is sat-
isfaotion. We are happy when we are satisfied, or, more 
accurately, to be happy we must be satisfied. But not every 
satisfaotion can be said to bring happiness. Some satisfao-
tions oause what might almost be oalled pain beoause, it 
would appear, there oan be too muoh satisfaotion, but, of 
oourse, never too muoh happiness. The oommon-plaoe "too muoh 
of a good thing" hints at a deeper signifioation than is 
usually asoribed it. The notion of goodness, when brought 
into the oonsideration, opens a new vista of thought. The 
essential note of goodness is suitability, and this enoom-
passes both the idea of fUlfilment and proportionateness. 
Satisfaotion may be present where suitability is not, and the 
remllt is the surfeit we haTe noted. The appalling appetite 
of a ohild for sweets is really being sa tisfie'd even when 
indulged far beyond what is suitable and good for him as a 
whole. The satisfaotion whioh brings happiness must be, ther~ 
fore, at onoe tull,and proportionate to the capaoity of the 
reoipient, oonsidered as a whole. Man's happiness will oon-
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s1st in the possession of a good which satisfies oompletely 
and proportionately all the oapacities and potencies of' his 
nature oonsidered as a whole. At this point a seeming paradox 
appears. Proportion implies, at least negatively, moderation, 
and moderation is against the human spirit at least in its 
present state. I think it useless to deny this last, for the 
real solution lies in the fact that nothing less than the 
possession of the highest and best, as completely as yossible, 
oan really satisfy human nature fully and proportionately. 
The satisfaction of each individual potenoy of human 
nature brings its proper delight, quiesoenoe in the possession 
of some good. But it is easily perceived that the satisfac-
tion of anyone capacity can. never bring happiness. Neither, 
on the other hand, can the satisfaction of all the potenoies, 
if this be achieved for them as individual and separate en-
titieS. . To satisfy one potency alone would leave a gaping 
w~nt. Fully to satisfy each one individually and separately 
would bring confusion and discord, for the full satisfaction 
of one at times conflicts with that of another. Happiness, 
then, oan only be had when man possesses that good whioh 
satisfies the prinoipal tendenoy of his nature primarily, and 
every other tendenoy in proportion as each subserves the full 
satisfaotion of the.principal. Subordinate ooordination is 
the rule of happiness in man's life. This alone assures that 
fulness and proportionateness in thB satisfaction of his whole 
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nature whioh is the oondition of happiness. Happiness, whioh 
is the last end of man, subjeotively oonsidered, that is, the 
last end whioh his nature indioated, may be defined as the 
conscious possession of the highest good. 
Objeotively considered the Last end of man is God, 
simply beoause there is nothing else adequate to the r~le. 
All the; arguments for this identifioation hinge on the faot 
that man's last end must be something whioh will satisfy 
adequately, permanently, proportionately all the potenoies and 
needs of human nature. Every system whioh denies or ignores 
this identifioation is unsatisfactory beoause it fails to 
appreciate man. But in approaohing this oonsideration it 
seems neoessary to oaution a oonstant awareness of several 
faots if we are to appreoiate the stand of the Christian 
humanist. The Christian humanist as suoh does not consider 
it incumbent upon himself to prove the existenoe of God. His 
philosophy does so, indeed; mlt his faith disposes of the 
matter even more conclusively. secondly, his philosophy 
teaches that happiness oonsists in the possession o:t a oonorete 
good. Lastly, that an argument from the nature of' Gdl, serves 
complementary-wise as an argument from human nature, sinoe 
this last is oontingent on the former. 
The last end of man must be identified with God, be-
oause God is what He is; and this is to say, conoomitantly, 
beoause man is what he is. Consoious of His own perfeotion, 
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God oould not, without betraying His own nature, oonstitute 
aIlything ot1:3r than Himself as the ultimate good and oonnat-
ural end of all oreation and, therefore, of man. To do other-
wise would be to aot inordinately, whioh, in turn, would be 
a violation of His supreme sanctity and perfeotion/whioh 
demands that all His external aotivity manifest the supreme 
and essential order of things.ll 
A further reason for this identifioation is adduoible 
and one that is, perhaps, more oompelling oeoause it affeots 
more olearly man's own interest and happiness. Only in God 
is that perfeot good whioh the mind oonoeives and the will 
reaohes out for as capable of perfectly satisfying human 
nature as a whole and all its parts proportionately, realized. 
The mind oonoeives this perfeot good after the experienoe of 
lesser goods, as oombining in itself all the perfeotion and 
sppetibilities of this latter without its limitations and 
confliots. This perfeot goodness oan be predioated only of 
God, beoause the whole reality, and oonsequently goodness and 
sppetibility, of every objeot oonsists in its imitation of the 
Divine perfeotion. The perfeotion, goodnas and appetibility 
of eaoh, therefore, is found in Him supremely, eminently, 
flawlessly, intensified, and He shines forth as the "unam 
ultimum, omnino desiderabile" of man's will, in the possession 
of whioh alone is happiness and rest. 12 
The foregoing disoussion may seem to have led us into 
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a metaphysioal darkroom, in whioh the original question is 
entirely lost sight ot. Granted all that has been said, how 
does it affeot the ideal ot individual development we started 
out to oonsider? The answer is: direotly. These metaphysioal 
oonsiderations lead to a very praotioal oonolusion: lite must 
be organized acoording to those considerations if it is not to 
be frustrated. The subordinated ooordination whioh, we saw, 
is neoessary to human happiness, when translated into action, 
means,tor Father Longhaye, the reoognition and maintenanoe ot 
the essential hierar~hy among the faoulties of man. 
The basis ot the essential hierarohy ot faoulties upon 
which Father Longhaye lays suoh stress13 is, first of all, 
psyoho10gioal. When considered psycho10gioally, as a matter 
of faot, it leaves us oold. But when we come to oonsider it 
in the light of the attainment of the end ot our existenoe, 
funotionally, so to speak, and morally, we peroeive that it 
is the natural and neoessary foundation of the fruitful life. 
The aoademio aspeot of the question vanishes, giving way to a 
very personal interest. One oan quite dispassionately oonsid 
or nonoha1antly waive aside (as temperament prompts) the 
problem of formal oolor. When brought into a true perspective 
of things, it really doesn't matter where oolor is. But it is 
a question of tremendous moment whether or not one is respon-
sible for one t s aot ionsj whether the head or heart must rule 
life for the greatest }:l.appiness. It is thus that the hier-
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archy of faoulties is oonsidered, as olosely bound up with 
the moral question, the question of the attainment of the last 
end. Psychological disoussion, save what is absolutely neces-
sary to a olear understanding of terms, is out of due order 
here. "Essential tf hierarchy may best be taken here as essen-
tial to the attainment of the goal of life. The rule of sub-
ordina ted coordina ti on ho lds sway, and we sa.y tha t faoul ty 
is essentially nobler and more to be respected which makes 
most directly for the last end, or upon the action of which 
the last end depends. Vie may, oonsequently t speak of a sub-
jective and an objective, of a moral, a.l cultural, and psy-
chologioal priority among the faculties. 
Father Longhaye's hierarchical scheme rests upon the 
dualistic conception of man as consisting of body and soul. 
The faoul ~i es can, therefore, De divided accordihg as they 
derive from or pertain principally to the soul or the body, 
or to both at once. We say principalll pertain or derive, 
because the actions and. funotions in this life are all)to 
some extent, of the oomposite. The spiritual faculttBs. in-
telligence and Will, pertain to the soul, though extrinsically 
conditioned in aotion by the body. The senses are of the 
body, though animated and vitalized by the soul. Lastly, 
sensi bili ty and imagination blend, as it were, the two - oody 
and soul - and oan be said to pertain wholly and only to the 
composite.14 The prinoiple of subordination, we have said, 
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is tu.notional and moral, that is, funotional with regard. to 
the last end of man. 
The intelleot is essentially superior to the imagina-
tion and the senses beoause ideas are "per sett universal and 
oonoerned with essenoes. The senses and the imagination are 
bound up essentially and wholly with the partioular and mate-
rial. The intelleot, .ithout violating or denying the partio-
ular and the ph7sioal, transoends them, pieroing through to 
the essenoe and by abstraotion molding the intentional univer-
sal. It thus gives man a grasp of the wider truth and allo-
oates him more dominantly in reality. It is only by the 
knowledge .a! universal essenoes, suoh as goodness and the likeJ 
that man oan oome to understand his last end, the attainment 
of whioh alone oan bring him happiness. Consequently the 
priority of intelleot is valid, neoessary, and essential. 15 
A parallel superiority establiShes the supremaoy o~ 
the will over sensibility. The one is essentially spiritual, 
the other a great part flesh and blood. Not that this last 
faot essentially degrades sensibility. It rather lays sensi-
bility open to a oertain instability oonnatural to the fleSh. 
By the will man is made master, and oontrols; by sensibility 
he suffers and undergoes the movements of repulsion and at-
traction passively. As Fr. Longhaye wrote, 
---l'une est libre, l'autre est tatale. Ie 
puis empeoher l'impression de prevaloir et de 
me dieter ma oondulte; Je ae puls l'emp'oher 4e 
naitre et d'emouvolr.-
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The first clause of thi s oontrast refers to the work of the 
will, the second to that of sensibility. In the orientation 
of life toward the last end, the will is the power which serw 
man far better than feeling. When the intellect has brought 
light to his soul, he wills the orientation of his life toward 
the proper end. Ultimately, it matters very little whether 
he is~nsibly drawn or repelled by that end, though to be so 
drawn is a great help. If life were left to the guidance of 
sensibility a revulsion from the law of morality might wreck 
the only chance of happiness. The direction of life is a 
task for the stronger, more stable and dispassionate faculty 
of man, which is the will. 16 
In neither oase, however, is there any hint of a 
fundamental and essential opposition oetween the higher and 
the lower powers. The end of all is oommon; they differ in 
ability to attain that end beoause the lower powers need the 
direction of the higher. This is subordinated coordination 
among the powers, a characteristic which the perfect man 
shares with all creation, in which 
ttles etres infE!rieurs sont unis aux plus hauts 
pour concourir en sous ordre a la fin commune. 
Ainsi l'imagination est pour aider l'intelligence, 
la sensi bili te, pour servir 1a vol 0 n:te. tt17 
This analysis of the philosophio basis of Fr. 
Longhaye's ideal should help to visualize more clearly the 
goal toward which the (!hrist1an Humanist is working. But we 
must not take the parts discovered in analysis for the whole. 
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It is the synthesis of these ~arts as they exist in the mind 
of the Christian Humanist which is the real ideal. The 
Christian llumanistenvisages the oomp1ete, proportionately 
developed oharacter, poised, assured, dominant over life be-
oause his principles of action are founded on a rea1i ty. The 
parts of this whole are not of value apart from the synthesis. 
The Christian Humanist is not the lover of any part for its 
own sake, but of all the parts for and in the whole. He wants 
not a man who lives oy mechanical laws; who would look for a 
mathematical precision in the ba1anoe and proportionate de-
velopment of powers; lumbering through life, as it were, like 
a great machine. He desires a man who lives in the light of 
the splendor of the whole, whose aotion is that of a vital 
organism, jealous of its own life and perfection, compliant 
and adaptable to all Circumstances, not through weakness, but 
in pursuit and for the furtherance of its own perfection. It 
is the perfection of the whole whioh is sought, and the fUll 
perfeotion. Therefore the Christian Humanist refuses to ex-
aggerate the worth of anyone aspeot of his nature, or on the 
other hand, to retrench from the fullness of his nature's 
perfection by a false humility. 
He maintains that the full and proportionate develop-
ment of man's nature is synonymous with happiness. He re-
oognizes that happiness is not a word which oan be defined in 
terms of the here and now without negleoting and frustrating 
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the finest and highest possibilities of human nature. The 
moral issue, therefore, even on purely philosophical grounds, 
become s predominant in his mind. By the moral issue he means 
the regulation of his life to the attainment of the full de-
velopment and happiness which his nature oraves. Reason and 
faith tell him that in its pure idea, his nature oan only be 
fully satisfied by the possession of God, in the exercise of 
that supernatural life, the potenoy for which is oonnatural 
to his essenoe. He does not seek to stop short, in a mis-
guided humility, and blind himself to the full truth. God has 
deigned to offer him the means of actuating this potency for 
supernatural life, through Christ. The Christian Humanist 
gladly and gratefully avails himself of this offer because he 
is true to the basic idea of all humanism: the fullness of 
life for man. 
Nevertheless he is not so fond, in his idealism, as 
to lose sight altogether of the hard facts of the aotual oon-
tingenoy. He recognizes that, just as he is, man is capable 
neither of completely maintaining the hierarchy of powers, nor 
of living the supernatural life necessary to his full per-
feotion. It has been well said that humility is at the basis 
of all ethios, and the reoognition of these humiliating facts 
is the basis of Christian Humanist10 ethios. For the Chris-
tian Humanist, (who, except for the recognition of these 
faots, would be on a l.eve 1 with the humanistio posi ti vist and 
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agnostio), there is only one answer and solution, only one 
way to the attainment of his goal: the full perfeotion of his 
nature, is Christ, in Whom he sees God's own solution and rem-
edy for the plight of man, and the path He has pointed out to 
the attainment of the perfeotion for which He destined human 
nature i.n oreating it. 
What has been outlined here is but the philosophio 
basiS of Christian Humanism. But its real soul is in the 
Christocentric aspect. iheChristian Humanist. looks upon humani\j 
philosophically, and sees in outline the potential beauty of 
1ts full stature; he looks upon it, as it is, and sees its 
impotence to aohieve its perfection of itself; he looks upon 
Christ and sees in Him, and in the way of life He teaches, at 
once the full appreciation of the possibilities, of human 
nature and the strength to overcome its present disabilities. 
Only then can he cry out with Shakespeare, "How beauteous is 
mankind," but adding the significant olause. "since redea.ed 
by (Jod made man and raised 'by grace to supernatural perfec-· 
tion. II 
II 
When Irving Babbitt wrote that humility is the base 
ot all true and sound ethiCS. he very probably did not ap-
preCiate the full import of his statement. At least, it is 
oapable of a deeper meaning than the one he ascribed it. and 
this deeper meaning Christian Humanism perceives as the only 
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true one. The humility Babbitt has in mind was the moral in-
dolenoe he believed is an inherent weakness of human nature. 
The humility at the base of Christian Humanism is the humility 
that takes aooount of original sin, and differs from ~abbitt's 
as a cause differs from a sympto~. 
We noted that the Christian Humanist, though a man of 
an ideal, is not so fond as to overlook the facts of the con-
tingenoy in which his efforts toward his ideal m11st De made. 
The contingenoy will often modify, not the ideal itself, but 
the attitude toward it, turning mere aspiration to a salutary 
oanniness for praotical strategem for its attainment. To say. 
therefore, that the Christian Humanist takes cognizance of the 
circumstances under which he must strive to realize his ideal, 
is not to say that he retrenches from the loftiness of his 
ideal, but merely that he sets himself to a practical solution 
of the problems oonfronting him in its attainment. His ideal 
is true, beoause based upon the nature of man. But experience 
tells him that all is not as ordered as the Creator intended 
it to be. The arguments which lead him to the conolusion that 
a hierarohy of faculties is natural to man and essential to 
his happiness, are irrefragable. But in actual life he sees 
that this hierarohy is seldom appreCiated and maintained, be-
oause the very elements whioh are to be alined seem to have 
no inherent tendency toward the neoessary order, but rather a 
power of selfassertion, so to speak, whioh leaves war and 
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disorder where concord and subordination should reign. This 
discord manifests itself sometimes as indolenoe; sometimes 
much more forcibly as perversity. So it must be conoluded, 
that some principle of disorder has been introduoed into the 
human cosmos, which, like an unleashed world, tracks confusion 
in its wake. 
This principle of disorder cannot be something en-
tirely outside of human nature. Since man has free Will, only 
a deliberate deflection from the law of his nature can really 
confound and oonfuse his life. But this deliberate defleotion 
which alone can account for the confusion and insubordination 
in man's life oannot be the work of each individual sinoe this 
confusion is manifest long before the activity of responsible 
ehoice begins. In other words, it has become in a sense con-
natural, and is universal. Therefore, this c·Jnfusion must 
have been introduced by deliberate act at some time and by the 
act of one of such a position in the race as to make the con-
se~uences of his act the heritage op his posterity. The 
rational man looks for an explanation which will cover all 
these facts. The Christian Wumanist alone can find it) and he 
finds it in the teaching of the Church, in a word, in the 
Incarnation and all it implies. 
"The theology of the Christian ltumanist, n wrote Abbe 
nr~mond, "is that of the Church." The j.ncarnation 1.S the 
central and root dogma of Christianity, and the Christian 
~----------------------------------------------------------------I 
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}illlna.nist attributes to the word exactly the meanina ~iven it 
b'T the 1i vi ng Chllrch: the Second Person o'f the Holy Trinity, 
true God, assumed a true human nature, and, being born of 
woman, dwelt among men for their instruction and salvation. 
The Christian humanist finds both the noble conception of 
human nature he had formed by reason and the disorder in it 
experience discovers to him, verified in the fact and implica-
tions and connotations of this dogma of the faith. But even 
more, he discovers here also the ground upon which to build 
hope for the rehabilitation of man's nature, in the new life 
which the Incarnation opens to man. For not only does the 
Incarnation and all it implies verify what reason and experi-
ence show, but it goes farthe~ by pointing out the means by 
which the nooility of man's nature may be reasserted and in-
sured. 
The immediate object of the Incarnation was the re-
demption of mankind. Redemption presupposes a fall, and a 
fall postulates the native nobility and perfection of our 
nature, thereby explaining its actual disorder and imgerfectio~ 
'Redemption by God further implies that the nature of the fall 
was such that man could not himself regain his former status. 
This is easily understood since the will is the sole instru-
ment of deliberate action man has. Disorder could come into 
man's life only by a positive deflection of the human will 
from the due order of things. The tall must have consisted 
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in the deliberate choice of a. lesser good at a cruoial. moment. 
The result ot this choioe affected human nature somewhat as 
the desertion or treason of the leader would affeot the morale 
of an army. Scattered and impaired, though not destroyed, 
such a disorganized body awaits a hew force to revive its 
,pristine spirit and disoip11ne. So too human nature, disorder 
ed and weakened,waited for succor. 
God seems to have waited a long time before realizing 
, 
(the plan of the Inoarnation, to convinee men that, alone, they 
f Gould never brlng a bOllt the reba bill to. tlon o:t th eir nature so 
essential to happiness. Many men are not convinced of this 
ret. When man had exhausted all his resouroes in the effort 
to find happiness, God offered His solution of the problem: 
;Christ. 
The assistanoe Christ gives: strikes at the very root 
: .. ! our trouble. The oentral need in the restoration of our 
is the re-assertion of the snpremaoy of w1ll and re~­
These powers are degraded and debilitated by the dis-
of sin: so that of itself reason finds 1t impossible to 
sp many things, and the will 1s unable to exercise its 
roper funotion with vigor. By His teaChing Christ brings 
e neoessary light to the reason; by His graoe, new strength 
o the will. 
!he Incarnation i$, moreover, a heartening oonfirma-
of the dignity am worth re&sondisoovers in human naturae 
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God did not soorn to be man in order to save men. The nature 
He deigned to make His own is not to be despised. Not even 
the degradation of sin oould make God overlook the essential 
worth of His handiwork and rest oontent to see it frustrated. 
In the realization of this faot the Christian Humanist finds 
the source of new oertitude, oourage, hope and strength to 
bend to the task of oooperation required of him in the noble 
work of re-habiliating and perfeoting his nature • 
.But the effect of Christ's partaking of our nature ts 
far deeper than all thiS. We need not enter here upon the 
details of the Church's te&ehing on the Christian's life in 
Christ. Ne need only state the faot.With the coming of 
Christ mankind was plaoed upon an entirely new footing toward 
God. From oreatures men have beoome the adoptive sons of God, 
through their brotherhood with Christ. The fruition of the 
rights and privileges, the fulfilment of the duties of this 
sonship beoomes the new destiny and life for man. The latent 
supernatural potency philosophy reoognizes in man beoomes now 
an intense positive need for man. Happiness has acquired a 
new and richer meaning •. contemplating these truths, which 
follow inevitably on the very notion of the Incarnation,the 
Christian humanist oan say with the deepest oonviction, "How 
beauteous is mankind since redeemed by God and raised to the 
supernatural plane by grace. ft 
From the realization of the truths which fOllow upon 
IUS 
• Inoarnat10n, there 1s born the noble 1ndiv1dua11sm ot the 
1st1an Human1st. It 1s an indiv1dua11sm ot personal re-
When the truths ot h1s tai th are taken out ot 
he sees that they have no other t1eld ot appli-
tion than his own soul and lite. It human nature has tallen. 
'0 ind1v1dual is tree trom the e~eots ot that tall. save by 
speoial dispensation. It a nat1ve worth yet o11ngs to that 
1t olings in eaoh 1nd1v1dual. It 
I J d devi sed an eoonomy to redeem the tallen human race, the 
otors in that eoonomy are indiv1duals, to eaoh ot whom a 
eoial and partioular applioation of' the divine plan is 
This application oannot be mde without the 00-
the individual. Individual, personal, willing 
oooperation with the working of graoe is the 
deal whioh the·· Chri etian Humani st takes for his own, true to 
basio note of all humanism, the fullness ot l1fe. This is 
only true aDl sound Christian 1nd1v1dualism, 8. personal 
eaoh man's 1n see1ng that the work of Christ 
\1113 brougb. t to fru1 tion 1n h1mself. 
I am fully oonso10us that all this may seem the merest 
, 1ati tude to manl'. There is no better answer to those who 
lWould think so than to quote Abbt Brlmond, who also was oon-
:Boious tha t many would be so atte ote4. He write s: trlndeed 1 
~Ca.n it (Christian Humanism) show nothing newer and more orig-
inal? But what more is wanted?ft That is just it. What more 
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~s wanted? Everything is here. A fUlness of life which no 
rther ideal can ofrer. We may well say, what more is wanted? 
I 
III 
!he i4eal of the Christian HUmanist has been impugned. 
; .. ometimes bitterly, as wholly undeserving of the appellation 
l'human. n It is notour purpose to oarry on a polemic for it t 
:~' 
illere. Frankly the ideal needs no apology, onee it is under-
\ 
l.tood; and indeed most of its oritios, Irving Babbitt for 
;; 
[instance, really are a ttaoking what they do not fUlly under-
',tand. We shall, however, notice, only briefly of course, the 
~hief of the eharges brought against Christian Humanism. A 
:,onsideration of these may serve to bring out the full mean-
:lng of the ideal. 
Christian Humanism, writes one critio, with typiaLl 
erioan soorn for distinctions, is a o~promiset18 And he 
sts in that as though it were a devastating condemantion, 
bsolutely unanswerable. The same idea is expressed ~y pater, 
delioately, as we would expect, but quite as olearly. 
aNo acoount or the Renaissance oan be oom-
plete without some notioe of the attempt of 
oertain Italian soholars to reooncile Chris-
tianity with the religion of anoient Greece. a 
he grounds upon whioh these charges are made must be oon-
1dered, before an answer oan be attempted. H1stor1aLlly, 
''these ori tios maintain that Christian Humanism does not make, 
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its appearanoe until a~ter the real glory of the Renaissanoe 
had begun to wane, and even then it appeared, not as an indig-
enoUS bloom, so to say, but as a reactioD.,cn 'bone hand, to the 
sensualist aspeot of the Renaissance, and on the othe~ as a 
concession to the new freedom the Renaissance had brought into 
life. The reaction was against men like Valla, let us say, 
paganism, the "reaotionaries" were wise enough to realize, is 
- always a step downward in these days. Yet these same reac-
tionaries were too much the ohildren of their times to be 
willing to relinquish entirely the new and wider life o~ 
sense experienoe opened by the Renaissance, and the liberty 
held out. The result was that general spirit of compromise, 
"jesuitry", which has been the objeot of so many attaoks. The 
Ratio studiorum of the Jesuits is brought forward as the 
embodiment of this spirit in e~uO&tional ideals. And Paul 
Elmer More brings forward the "velut officiosa mendacia 
8001esiae" the Catholic doctrine of evil, as the supre.me ex-
. ample, in theology. Christian Humanism in this light is the 
supreme attempt to live the life of pagan Greeoe, while at 
the same time retaining the benefits of the Christian dis-
pensation. The effort to reoonoile the two modes of life is 
no longer the naive but candid effort of Pioo della Mirandola. 
but the dark diplomaoy of the Sooiety of Jesus. 
The misunderstandings upon whioh these notions rest 
are easily peroeived. The basio faot that the humanism of 
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,tbe Christian }fumanist is not an independent dootrine, but a 
, 
~emper of mind, an attitude toward a dootrine already estab-
,lished, is not grasped. The Christian Humanist is a man of 
the Faith who takes a oerta'in view of the faots of Chris-
:t1ani ty, a view whioh is founded. on these faots even though it 
Uffers from other attitudes toward Christian teaohing. He 
differs from, but must not be opposed to the Fatherso~ the 
'desert, or the solitary monk of La Trappe. None is more 
Christian than the others. Eaoh of them lays particular 
:.tress upon one asp eot of Christianity. acoording as tem-
erament or graoe may lead. But all the aspeots stressed are 
.true. The asoetic is not mistaken because the humanist is 
.oorrect. To oppose them is to misunderstand the motives im-
',pelling each. So, too, it is wrong to treat any of them apart 
:'trom the body of truth upon whioh all found their ideals of 
life. To maintain the assertion tlat Christian liuman.ism is 
• oompromise one must Show positively that it adulterates the 
prino~ples of Christianity. This has not been done and oannot 
·be done. On the oontrary, the staunoh adherenoe of the best 
·Christian lCumanists to the full ideal of the Faith is manifest 
'trom a oonsideration of the lite of anyone of them. Chris-
.~ian humanism is above all, Christian. 
The historioal fallaoy involved rests on a too narrow 
View of the taots. Christian Humanism, as an historioal 
::phenomenon, is emphatically not a (mere) reaotion. It is muoh 
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t itruer to 88.7 tha. t 1 t ls the real h:waan1sm, and the anlmallsm 
'of some Renaissanoe humanlst. a straying trom the original 
" , 
path, or better, a tall trom the original he~ht. this laat 
riB the work ot men, who would haTe gone the same way in any 
'age, under some pretense or other. they made the revival ot 
ancient oulture an occasion tor the expression and glorifloa-
,tion of their own lusts under a mask of eml ture. the Chris-
t1an humanism exists in lts purity, 1n Da Feltre, long betore 
the appearanoe of the later, less noble type; it oomes to 
flower in a host of othera:Salmeron, Ledesma, Richome, 
Bellarmine, and oontinues to OUl' 9wn day in Father Longhaye 
; and many more _ But we are wroDg ln startl118 as late as Pe-
;traroh. !hls is to oonoede, at least by silenoe, another 
'h1stori,al fallaoy. that of the barrenness of the Middle Ages 
in 1deala of ou.l~e. This fallaoy is 10sill8 ground more 
: l8~idly every day. It is fifty years sinoe one oould write 
" ~ 
r w1 th 1mpuni ty, 
1'ille' as our eulture1s with the olas-
sloal spirit, we oan bae41J imaglne how deeply 
the human mind was move" _.n. at the Renais-
sanee, in the midst ot a frozen world, the 
buried fire ot an01en'ti art. rose from under 
the soil. ~ 
Modern sCholars. as HaBk1ns and Taylor, bave disproved this 
. tallaoy utterly_ What, they simply ask. of 1a11sbury, and 
'others too many t6 mention? In suoh men as these the 1deal ot 
. Christian Humanism Bad already begun to show itselt~ The 
, Christian H'I1IIlanistic ldeal is as old as the :Faith and 1s its 
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.legi tima te progeny. 
These misunderstandings which lead the opponents of 
Christian Humanism astray arise in large part from a narrow 
land mistaken view ot Christianity. Christianity is looked 
" .., 
upon as the religion of the (J'"WPIlt (/"T/,PfJ'I dootrine with a ven-
:g.ance, which preaches implaoable war on the flesh and 1s a 
fb11ght to all earthly oeauty. By contrast, ancient culture, 
fas 1dea11zed by time, comes to be represented as a golden age 
tot liberty t when human nature (by which 1.s often meant man's 
lelma11 tyl had come into its own. 
" Christiani ty would not be true to Christ if it were 
(to preach the entire ,ext1notion of the life of man's lower 
-.ture. Christ came to restore, and not to destroy. His 
'Church follows in His footsteps. Her aim and ideal is the 
.storation of order in human nature; the oomplete denial and 
,estruction of nothing in man save errors of his mind and the 
,.rversi ty of his will. Christian restraint has as its aim 
'only the perf.ct ion of the whole and. the supremacy of the 
~1ghest, in man's nature. Christianity does not preaoh war 
flesh as such. It is not. so simple as to impute evil 
flesh, which is but the instrument of a higher power. 
It preaohes war on that disorderliness of mind and will, whioh 
'elibera.tely putting as1de the f1nal end, chooses tla present 
\nd apparent good The flesh 1s an agent of evil only when 1ts 
*t1sfact1on 1s sought to the negleot of that of the whole 
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,e.ture. When Paul Elmer More writes that Platonism, as 
'-,opposed to Christianity, oonsiders the oonoupisoent spir1t, 
Ira ther than the flesh) as the enemy of true happ1ness, he only 
J~ 
t~ows how little he has grasped the true Christian point of 
t~1ew. Of that fallaoy whioh depiets the pagan ideal as offer-
'1n8 a life of liberty, fru1 tion and poise whioh Christian1 ty 
;.an never gi ve. we need say nothing. !fhe lives of those who 
bave deserted the1r Christian heritage to make the 14eals and. 
of paganism the springs of aotion in their lives oonfute 
fallaoy. at least by the moral ineffectualness, if not 
'1 the absolute depravity of their lives. Winoklemann is ex-
enough. 
!he oharge that the ideal of Longhaye and his fellows 
,1olates the essential note of humanism by the introduction 
t the supernatural, appears)at f1rst,qu1te plaus1ble. out, 11'1 
et, pOints to a oonfusion of terms by some of those who make 
e oharge, and to a oomplete misunderstanding)by all the 
of Christian HumaniBm)ot the Christian dootrine in-
the question. The term ·supernatural" as used by 
11 those who accept the threefold division of lite as out-
,'1ned by Babbitt, More, and She1'1DB.l'1, is confused I'll th 'spiri-
,al' and 'divine'. Of oourse, argument 1s useless until some 
ot terms is reaohed, and the effort to olear these 
rms as used by the writers mentioned would be a task in it-
,It. We shall attempt it in an appendix. In order to prove 
lS8 
{the oharge of betraying human nature brought against an ideal 
, 
k 
r"hich introduoes the supernatural, it would have to be shown 
that in this ideal the essential nature of man would be vio-
].9.ted by aotivity on a supernatural plane. Christian Humanism 
1S oompletely olear of this charge. 
The Catholic Churoh te~ohes that in being elevated to 
the supernatural pl8ll8 of aotivity, the nature of' man is not 
violated, but perfeoted. By Christ's Inoarnation, the super-
natural life becomes necessary for the perfection and happine 
of man. But man,as man, is de.tined to possess the supernat-
ural end whioh becomes him as a ohild of God. The supernatul'a 
is not a new nature replacing h~n nature. but an elevation 
of human nature to a plane of life and action to whioh it 
could never attain by its own effort,- but whioh is eminently 
suitable to and oompatible with the very essenoe of human 
nature. The agent nature remains intact in elevation. It is 
the human agWl~hiCh really p erforms t~e superna tura.l aot and 
.t whioh will possess the rewar4 of tlB.t aot. Supernatural acti 
, 
1~ 1 ty perfects human nature by giving the distinoti vely human 
I 
faoulties, intelligenoe and Will, an essentially hlgher kind 
and wider range of exerci sa than that proper to their nature 
and natural aotivity. This has been the oonstant teaching of 
the Church, and the Christian Humanist aooepts it completely. 
This dootrine DaS yet to be impugned by comp-etent theologians 
and the aco.ptance of it tN.a Chri stlan Hamanism of the 
184. 
!obarges ot being untrue to human nature. 
On the oontrary, an examination ot this charge males 
it olear that the ideal of the Christian ~umanist more oom-
pletely provides for the full and proportionate satisfaotion 
,nci aoti vi ty of man's nature than any other the. t has be<en 
proposed. It reoognizes that every natural faoulty must play 
a part in the attainment of happiness and must be satisfied 
and fulfilled it happiness is to be oomplete. It introduoes 
the ideal of subordinated coordination, whioh at once does 
away with a false violent dualism, and yet reoognizes the need 
of discipline. It is not impeded oy the false humility whioh 
would make some shrink from an "unhuman If ideal, for it does 
no t contuse the vi tal terms, "human· and • superna tural" • Abov 
all. it is most solioitous of the full perfeotion at' man and 
consequently may lay superior olaim to a human appeal and a 
human 40 estrine • 
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CON'CLUSIOB 
~he aim of thisessaYtaa originally statedJis to an-
swer the question, is humanism at bottom an ethioal or a lit-
erary issue? The answer aeemed clear. Its basic issue is 
ethioal; the literary issue, though always present. distinctly 
secondary. The examination of the dootrines of several human-
1s'b3 oonfirmed this. 
In the wri tings of two of the authors studied the moral 
and ethical question was raised as the immediate and primary 
issue to be dealt with. In the third, it is presupposed that 
the moral question has already been drawn out and sett~4, and 
the literary ideal expounded follows upon a particular resolu-
-tion of the ethioal ~estion. The literary issue is always 
secondary to the moral issue. As Mr. Babbitt wrote: REither 
beauty oannot be defined at all, or we must say that only is 
beautiful whioh seems so to the right kind of man - he whose 
whole view of life is oorrect - whioh is to 8&1' that the prob-
lem of beauty is inseparable from the ethioal problem.- Since 
the problem ot beauty is the oentral issne of aesthetics, lit-
erary aesthetios included, the statement is to the point here. 
Moreover, this conviction is oommon to all three ot the writers 
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; studied. Some may protest that this is to stretoh beauty on 
·an ethioal raok. Father Longha1e has foreseen this objeotion. 
t and his answer is unhesitating and unoompromising. Speaking 
i 
I 
of those who would free art from moral obligation, and envisag-
, 1ng a oase of oonfliot between the moral and the beautiful, he 
I 
. writes: aP~rissent, en oe cas, toutes les beautes de la parole 
litteraire. P~risse oe qu'il taut payer d'un sacrifice d'! 
, hamaur ou de d'cence. Qui atmet une morale n'a plus droit 
/ 4'hesiter." It is not for us to enter the confliot. We are 
studying faots, and this fact is ~lear:' the ethioal issue is 
uppermost in the minds of these representative humanists. and 
to think or treat ot humanism as primarily a literary topio, 
is, oonsequently, wrong. 
Yet the literary issue, aswe have said,is everlasting 
for the humanist. In the case ot the humanists whose ethioal 
dootrines .ere examined the literary interest is deoidedly 
to the tore. Eaoh has propounded a theory of literature and 
their literary opinions have reoeived muoh attention. It is 
a part of the aim of this essay to traoeJhowever sketchilyjthe 
. relation bet.een the literary theory and the ethical teaohing 
ot eaoh. But before doing so it seems .ell to swmmarize the 
latter brietly. This summary will also help to make olear 
the relation between their ethioal and literary opinions by 
placing them in olose Juxtaposition. 
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W1th1n the compass ot a common des1re tor the full 
pertect10n ot the ind1v1dual, wh1ch was stated to be the bas~r 
note ot humanism~the ethical 1deals evolved by the several 
thinkers cons1dered m1ght be expeoted to ditter as the views 
of each vary on quest10ns essent1al to the eth1cal problem. 
These, questions, orietly enumerated, are the plaoe ot n:ata-
physios in eth1os; the quest10n ot dual1sm, and the re11g1ous 
question. The questions must be answered betore an ethical 
ideal can be ereoted; the nature ot eth1cs demands that they 
be. It w1ll be our purpose to rev1ew the att1tnde ot each of 
the wr1ters studied toward these questions in turn, and ventur 
to draw some oonolus1ons touching human1sm as a whole. 
~e quest10n ot metaphys1cs torces 1tself upon the 
ethioal thinker simply because he is dealing with things as 
they are, with rea11ties. He 'seeks to adJust rea11ties one to 
another, and to do this in any sat18:tactor3' a.nd permanent 
manner 1 tis 0 bTious tha t he must know the nature ot the real-
ities wlthwhioh he is dealing, and metaphysios is the scienoe 
of the nature ot rea11ty. IrT1ng Babb1tt, as we have seen, 
reoognizes the metaphysical quest1on, but in contemplating its 
solut1on he 1s impeded by graTe obstaoles. !he first of these 
obstaoles 1s his acceptance ot the pos1t1vist10 tenet that 
only that is real which is immediately percept1ble., !h1s 
lZO 
• tenet closes the human mind to whole stretches of reality whi<il. 
are necessary for it to know. Babbitt argues that since we 
oannot know the essences of things, we cannot hope to have an 
ethics based on such knowledge. Thus the nexus between meta-
· physi~s and ethios is broken, and ethics becomes for him an 
empirioal scienoe. 'Plato and Longhaye, on the other hand, 
· recognize the.neoessity of this mexus for the validity and 
· oompelling force of any ethics, and are careful to build their 
ethioal ideals on metaphysical bases. Butt despite this argu-
ment, they differ ,widely. As the realism of Plato is not the 
realism of Longhaye so the ethics of Plato is not that of 
Longhaye. It is beyond the scope of a. brief r6sume to enter 
into these dif~erences. The important thing tQ notioe is that 
they are both realists, that is, both recognize that the nat 
of things oan be known, and must form the basis of a satis-
factory ethics. 
The difference of doctrine between positivistio and 
realistic humanism affeots very deeply the idea.l of life eaoh 
offers. The ideals based on realistic philosophy have a oom-
pelling force wholly lacking to the positivistic ideal. If 
. an ideal is founded upon the evident nature of things no rea-
sonable man can excuse himself from conformity and assent to 
that ideal. He may deny that this or that particular ideal 
of life, whioh purports to be founded upon the absolute nature 
of things, interprets and represents that reality adequately. 
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BUt even in that supposition the basio truth is maintained; 
one who denies the adequaoy o~ a given ethioal ideal implioit 
admits that if the ideal is based on reality he must conform 
, to it, since, by his own admission, the only reason why he oan 
i 
,'exempt himself from oonformi ty is that the ideal itself does 
not square with the truth of things. In the face of this 
, charge the question shifts and is no longer ethioal but purely 
metaphysioal, and the ethios will bind just in so far as it 
can be demonstrated to be based on the evident nature of 
. things. An ethios based upon a positivistio philosophy is 
never compelling. A really reasonable man will rejeot it tor 
the very reason that so many readily accept- it: its flexibili 
and its allowanoe for the tree play of individuality. He sees 
tha t posi ti vism make s ethics a. man's pri va. te property. a doo-
trine, though inviting, yet false and dangerous. Its flexi-
bilityjwhioh springs from its laok of oontaot with the nature 
of things, degrades positivistic ethios to moral opportunism. 
Thus the same conolusion is again foroed upon us: ethics must 
be based upon the nature of things. On this we may venture 
to conclude that only the humanism of the realist can aohieve 
satisfaotorily the aim 01' all humanism: an ideal of life and 
oonduot whiohwill provide for the full and proportionate 
development of man's nature. 
perhaps the most outstanding oharaoteristio of the 
·tbree ideals considered, when stu4.ied comparatively, is tll.l~ 
oommon note ot dualism. Irving Babbitt builds his whole 
structure on the immediate pereeption ot a -Higher Will" able 
to control expansive desire. The most prominen~practioal 
function attributed to "nous· in Plato's ideal is the guidance 
and regulation of the concupiscent element ot the soul, and 
oonsequently ot the destiny of the whole man. Father 
dualism is apparent in his very detinition ot morality as -the 
direotion ot the!£!! acts toward the tinal end." 
All are agreed that the faot of dualism is the basis 
of all ethics. All, further. are in acoord in holding that 
the ethioal aspect of dualism is an opposition of oontrol to 
unrestraint in the oonduot of lite. .ivergenoe oomes in the 
allooation ot~the power o~ oontrol and in the cbLracteristics 
assigned it. 
Babbitt is forced by his epistemological difficulties 
into a strained auL unnatural position. The Higher Will, as 
a consequence. strikes one as b.i~ very arbitr,ary. It rules 
like a divinely appointed lord whose aots are not open to 
comment and whose oounselors (in this oase Babbitt's ·stand-
ards") are ma4.e to feel that their counsel is merely advioe. 
This trait ot the "Higher Will" has earned tor its discoverer 
the condemnation of voluntar.ism •. '1ithout gOing so tar as to 
concur wholly in this last opinion. an etfort has been here 
made to show above that his handling of tho relations between 
... ~ 
-l3S 
intellect and will is far from satisfaotory. His chief. fail-
ing i8 a tendenoy to depreoiate reason, with a corresponding 
inclination to exalt the nHigher .ill- unduly. !he result 
for his ideal is anything but satisfactory. The reasonable 
man cannot give his sympathy to an ideal which deals so awk-
wardly wi th the facts of experienoe. 
Plato, on the other hand, flies to quite an opposite 
extreme. He allocates the power of control in life in an 
autonomous reason. This disposition ot the aatter is also 
entirely unsatisfaotory. It tails to account tor the most 
potent factor in human nature. tree will. !he presenoe ot 
this power is a faot of experienoe. Plato's: theory tails, 
like Babbitt's, to aooount for existing taots. 
Only in the third ideal studied do we find the elements 
of intelleot and will harmonized and coordinated in a manner 
which satisfies experience adequately_ We haTe tree Will; .e 
are intelligent. But neither will nor intellect is autonomous; 
both are so oonsti tuted by nature as to require each other 1 s 
oooperation. The light ot intellect is the guide ot the tree 
Will; the tree will pOSits the hUll'1&n. act. we are oonsoious 
that we oan w11l nothing absolutely W1known to us. we are 
also consoioua that the toreknowledge needed does not invali-
date the free aotion ot the will in any oontingency. !his 
oooperative aotivity is manifeetlT neoessary tor unity in lite. 
Consequently we may venture a second oonclusion, which 
1M 
(presupposing the first) may be formulated thus: only the 
humanism of the realist-libertarian offers an ethics which 
adequately accounts for all the facts of 'experience whioh must 
be taken into account in attaoking the ethioal pro bleB. 
It was stated that the motive which impels the human-
ist to ereot his ideal is a desire for the full development at 
human nature. No little of tlB div.rgenoebetween the ideals 
we have studied derives from the different interpretations of 
the phrase ftfull development of human nature. 1I The point at 
issue throughout may be reduced to a single question: the 
relation of the human to the supernatural. .l)oes the super-
natural. when introduced into an ideal of life for man, make 
tha. t i'deal less h'Wl&ll, i.e./less fitting to man, as man? Or 
does it make the ideal more eminently human? 
In the preface to Rousseau aDd Romantioism, we are 
told that life is experienoed on three planes. the natural. 
, (whiC~ might better be oalled the an1m&l),the human and the 
supernatural. In man. acoording to Babbitt. there is essen-
tiallyan element of the purely natural, (an1mal),besides the 
human element. Therefore) be goes on)no strict line oan be 
drawn between the two elements as far as the constitution of 
man is conoerned. As far as aotivity is concerned, the purely 
natural aotivity must always be subJected to the distinotively 
human in man. The human level is oharaoterized by the aotiv-
1 ty of the "Higher \fill".. The hu.man and the animal considered 
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as one in the human composite, however, ~orm a world in them-
selves, strictly opposed by Babbitt to the supernatural. Now 
in erecting an ideal ot conduct tor man it is obviously a 
retrogression to work on a principle which in itselt is appli-
cable to lite only in the natural level. Likewise, according 
to Mr. Babbitt, an ideal based on a prinalple ot lite on the 
su.perll8. tural plane is unti tted to man. We mu.st be careful to 
do Justioe to Mr. Babbitt's stand on this pOint. It would be 
entirely mistaken to represent him as violently oppos.dte the 
superll8.tural. In his own words, it it came to a choioe be-
tween reducing lite to the natural plane and seeking to guide 
lite by supernatural principles, he would rank himsel~ un-
hesitatingly with the suparnaturalists. But suoh a choice is 
not at all neoesSLrY. What is necessary is to attempt to li~e 
a tnll lite on a human plane, to "be human betore trying to 
be superhuman." He would have man live on a bowing acquain-
tanoe with the supernatural and the religious. 
Plato takes up quite an opposite position when he 
predicates divinity ot Knous" and the idea ot good. In the 
first plaoe,he would never subsoribe to this three~old divisio~ 
ot lite. Reason, he says, is the. distinotive mark of man's 
.. 
humanity and i.s itselt divine. The human eannot be adequately 
oonceived as separate trom the divine, and divinity is natural 
to the human in the sense that it beoomes the human essentialll 
When reason is supreme in lite man has reached the full pro-
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portionate life that naturally be.ome. him and lives thi8 lite 
in virtue ot a faoul ty whioh is d1 vine,. The 41 vine 1s es-
sental, theretore, to the fall human life. !fhis may soun4 
like sheer paradox, but how Gan any other meaning be taken trOll 
Plato's wort.? Reason is the distinotive m&~k of man's buman-
i ty (and tharetore the taoul ty whioh must be supreme in the 
distinotively human lite); but reason is itself divine; there-
fore the full di 8 t moti ve human life has somewhat of the 
divine a. part ot its eS8enoe. 
ft_e1' Longhaye faoe8the problem on the ground ot: 
scholastio philosophy. Consequently he would oonsent to the 
cradations of life that Babbitt enumerates only with qualifi-
oations. He would grant that there is a purely animal p18.l).e 
of lite abd that tor man to guide h1s life by prinoiples ad-
. Justed to this plane woUld be a distinot degradation. He Will 
grant, too:, that there is a dist1l1ctive human plme of lite, 
but he would not grant its opposition to the supernatural 
plane. He would distinguish. For man to live his l1te on & 
principle which only the angels, beoause of super-human qual-
itie., oan tollow, would be repqnant and unhuman; this he wo 
grant. But if by the supernatUl'&l plane is meant a plane ot 
aotivity in whioh the distinotive human faoulties exeroise an 
intense aotuation of their powera, we must aay that lite on 
that piane would oertaloly be neither repugnant nor unhumaa, 
but eminently becoming to man'8.nature. AnI. this last i. 
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exaotly what thl Christian ~i8t understands-by elevation 
to the supernatural plane. 
The Christian Humanist's view may be more olearlyand 
positively stated thus: elevation to the supernatural oan only 
be repugnant to the humanistio ideal it by moh elevation 
human nature would be violated or trustrated. Human nature 
oan only be violated or trustrated it its essential and dis-
tinotive aotivitiesbe so curbed or altered that the nature· 
atfeoted would no longer be human. Suoh would be the case lf 
mperuatural aotivlty meant aotivlty on the plane at the pure 
spiritual, the aotlvity say, ot an angel. If, oonsequently, 
elevation to a supernatural plane does not ourtail or alter, 
but it lt enhances man's distinotlve aotivities, it oannot be 
a violation o~ human nature. It man's lite were transmuted 
trom human into angell0 lif., there would be no elevation but 
essential alteration. The new lite aoquired would not neoes-
sarily be superna tura:t,"; it mlgh t be a me rely natural li fe on 
a higher level ot existenoe and activlty. Moreover, beoause 
the distinotlve powers at human nature oonstitnteall that 
ismaterlally necessary tor elevation to the supernatnral 
plane.activlty on the plane ot the supernatural is eminently 
sui table to human nature. J.zJ.7 ldeal of lite whioh purports to 
alm at the full development at human lite oannot overlook the 
superna tural potency ot human nature and stl1l be true to 1 t-
selt. 
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Christi&aity tekohea eleY&tion to the supernatural 
order in ~ust this sense. It demonstrates from man's very 
nature his potency for such eleT8.tion. It teaches that this 
elevation is a free gift o~ God, given through Christ, and 
maintains that the tull human life must,&ocordingly,include 
~pernatural activity, as exercised in grace by faith. Christ 
is not to be received or reJected as the individual may see 
fi t • !he new li f'e He brings i. not man' s to refuse Wi th im ... 
punity. H1s happiness lies in a ready &Qd complete acceptanoe 
of' it. 
We may venture on these grounds to draw the f'inal con-
clus1on. Since Christ oame to earth, only the Christian 
Humanist10 ideal can claim to achieve the essential aim of' all 
humanisa: the ~ll and proportionate development, beoause 1t 
alone takes account of the new lif'e whioh Christ willS that 
man shall live. 
II 
It would be unwise to be dogmat10 about the relation 
in wh10h the literary and eth1oa.l opinions of Babbitt, Plato 
and Longhaye stand to eaoh other, ao our di suasion will be 
confined to tracing obJective Gonnections between than, for 
the mo st part .. oonnections pointed out by the authora them-
selves. But this is really a distinot advantage, for it save. 
us useless conJecture and keeps us always on the sate ground 
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of the author's own worda. 
.... Babbitt 
Babbitt's opinion that the oonneotion between art (and 
of oourse literary art) and morality is immediate and neoesaa 
is olearly expressed in this sentenoe from Rousseau and Roman-
t10i"; ftEither that is beautiful which appearJso to the right 
kind of man, the man whose view of life is oorrect, or there 
is no beauty.- Beauty under some aspect or other is the obJect 
of literature, as of all art, but beauty itself must be in-
terpreted in ethical terms. Beauty is in some way a relation-
ship between man's soul and a oertain quality of reality. In 
order that this relation be true its terms must be oorreot; 
man. for his part, must have a oorreot view of reality as a 
whol~and of his position in the world,before he can pronounce 
upon beauty either concretely or in the abstraot. 
The history of man's spirit both in philosophy and in 
art seems to Babbitt to be the reoord of an almost continual 
osoillation between monistio extremes. Reality appears to 
man as a oneness whioh is alays ohanging, a living tissue 
woven of' the one and many, of motion and repose. So closely 
intertwined are these threads ot reality that only by a oon-
stant and prolonged effort oan man disengage them. and even 
then but imperfeotly. And he, weighed down by some conna tum 1 
indolenoe of spirit has save at rare intervals. refused to 
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make this effort and sought refuge from this toil i~ some 
snperfioial half truth, some reduotion of this living, com-
posite reality to one or the other of its oomponents, whioh of 
themselves are dead ani meaningless. ~ false and foolish trus 
in his own intelleot has led him to think that by a simple 
prooess, (so stmple he might have suspected it from the tirst~ 
he could abstract trom manitold real1ty the eternal essences 
ot things,and enoompasssin a narrow tormula,truth in its en-
tirety. ~t other times his indolenoe has led him to deny that 
there is any unity or purpose, any oneness, in reality at all, 
beoause it is so d1fficul t to peroei ve. Man has oonsistently 
refused to see, beoause to maintain this position demands con-
stant ettort and selt disoipline, that for him either extreme 
is untrue. Man has some peroeption ot the unity of reality, 
but only through the veil of illusion thrown about it by the 
multiplioity and movement of experienoe. This element ot il-
lusion is essential to man's intellectual life. Intellect-
ualism bas led him to moral tormalism, the casuistry ot di-
vines. Naturalism, the philosophy of the flux, has leveled ot 
the distinotion between man and the physioal world and has 
identitied the law ot his lite w1 th the law ot the physioal 
uni verse. Only the recognition of the true, though limited, 
tield ot his 'knowledge can reotity these errors and put man on 
the road to human. right l1ving. While his mind is essentiall 
bound to exper1ence ot the many, man yet has an intuitive> 
- 14.1 
though part1al, pereeption o~ the oneness, the unity, purpose 
a.nd law within the ~lux. !hough he oannot look up all truth 
in his ~ormula.c., neither can he d1spense wi th these, for they 
embody his intuitions of the one. The w1se man w111 see that 
the solution lies in the vital fUs10n of the one and the many. 
He must make a right use of 111usion to help him to l1ve pur-
pos1vely, humanely. He w1ll have standards, but they will be 
vi tal and flex1bla, oapable of expanding and conforming to 
fUrther reaches and new aspeots of reality as these are reveal 
ed. !he oonduot of life by flexible standards alone is human, 
and free, in a degree, from the tyranny of illusion because 1t 
makes the r1ght use of 111us10n. In ethioal terms this means, 
for Babbit~ that the expansive tendenoies of man's nature will 
be restrained and direoted by the power of. control wh10h 
operates acoord1ng to flexible,vital,moral laws framed on the 
experience of the past. l 
~he h1story of lite~ry art has seen the same osc1lla-
tion between mon1st10 extremes; the same 111usory reduction of 
all artistic reality to some ~alse unity. pseudo-classic1sm. 
the child of false intellectualism, placed the whole of beauty 
in form, and then fell into the egreg10us errox;i:;;formalism. 
Form came to mean not living control in art,but wooden imi-
tation by rule. Romantic1sm, at its core a revolt against 
pseudo-olassic formalism, rushed to the other extreme and de-
olared that all beauty is express10n, the unrestrained irres-
istible outpouring of vital personal emotion. Again the 
ist will see that ~ch extremes are ~alse and unhuman. 2 
To the humanist, Babbit expla1nS~beauty is essentially 
oomposed o~ two elements, torm and expression. Expression is 
the expansive/vital element, torm the limiting/circumscr1bing 
element. But he does not understand form to mean a stolid, 
wooden ~rame-work 1nto whioh the vital element of express10n 
is forced. Just as 1n the true humanist10 ethics the 
of conduct must be olear, yet flex1 ble, so the formal element 
of beauty 1s flexible and vital beoause tounded,not on mere 
rule and outer authority, but upon intuit10n of oneness in ex-
per1enoe. 3 
~he conduct of l1fe on a humanist10 plane must ot 
course preoede the creation ot a humanist10 art, beoause art 
is the oonsequent and express10n and, not the prime determinant, 
o~ a v1ew and mode of l1fe. A oorrect not1on of beauty is 
born only ot a correct eth10al view of l1~e. !he humanistic 
v1ew of l1~e will lead to a human1stic oonoept10no~ beauty 
and its embod1ment in art, & view of life and art of wh1ch the 
essent1al charaoter1st1c will be select1ve oontrol aocord1ng 
to vital and flex1ble law baBel upon 1ntuition of the onenesa, 
uni ty, and purpose behind the nux o~ experienoe. 
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:8. Plato 
Plato occnpies a'unique position'in the history of 
oritic1sm as the first or1t10 to raise, formally, the question 
of the relation between art and mora11ty_ ~his oonoern With 
the ethical aspeot of oritic1sm 1s quite what we m1ght expeot. 
1n view of the eth1cal preoconpation of all his thought_ His 
general v1ew of this relationsh1p, too, is qu1te what we m1ght 
expeot)far in oommon with all the anc1ent or1tios he holds 
that art should adhere striotly to the requ1rements of mora11 
As Father Longhaye expresses it, the ano1ents would bave blush 
ad at the thought of the "art for art's sake" of our day_ But 
ne1ther the preoccupation of Plato's thought w1th the eth10al 
aspeot of things,nor the general att1tu4e of the anoients 
toward the relat10n between art and mora11t~ Will _xpla1n the 
sharp antogonism wh10h pn ethioal grounds ,lato displays, 
toward the im1tative arts in the tenth book of the Republio.' 
After delineating at length the ideal oharaoter of the 
"ph11osopher'~an4 d1soussing the peouliar perfeotion embodied 1n 
th1s ideal,Plato reverts abruptly to the quest10n of the 1mi~ 
tative art.. !he top10 had already been touohed upon in an 
ear11er book where all but patr1ot10 and sacred hymns had been 
forbidden in the 1deal state. 1I0w Pl-ato aeems eager to bring 
forward in support of th1s raJeot1en the evidenoe whloh fur-
tlar discusslon has revealed. At the opening of the book 
socrates says: 
·Of the many excellenoes which I perceive in 
the order of our state t}:are is none which/upon 
reflection,~ses me better than the rule about 
poetry. 
To what do you refer? 
To the reJection ot imitative poetry which 
oertainly ought not to be received, as I see 
far more clearly now that the parts of the soul 
haTe been distinguished."5 
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!he relation between imitative poetry and the parts of the 
soul may be diffioult to see at first. but When we recall Just 
how important a role these ·parts" of the soul play in Plato's 
ethioal ideal. light begins to dawn. 
Plato distinguish .. three parts of the soul. the oon-
oupisoent, the spirited and the rational. Eaoh of these is 
striving oonstantly to attain the good proper to itself - the 
oonoupisoent element for all the satisfaotion of sense, the 
spirit for the benefits of power and glory, reason for truth 
and reality. ultimatel~ for the Idea of Good. But it i8 im-
possible that eaoh of these elements should be satisfied in-
disoriminately. for it is olear from every man's experienoe 
that reason frequently opposes the desires of the senses and 
the spirited element, if unrestrained, oftenpreoipates a man 
into action. he lives to regret as foolhardy. If peace is to 
reign in the soul one must regulate the satisfaotion of eaoh 
part by the good of the whole. Sense and spirit are blindly 
impelled by nature toward a good whioh is only partial, oapa-
b~ only ot satisfying the desires peculiar to eaoh. Only 
reason 8ees olearly and 'e81reB the true and comple"e goot 
wh1Gh inoludes in itselt. &s what i8 perteot always inoludes. 
the pertection of the les8 perfeot. the partial goods which 
sense and ~irit seek. reason alone, oonsequently, is able to 
perceive and seek the good ot the whole man. To it then should 
be given the supremaoy over the powers of the soul to regulate 
and provlde for the satlstaotion ot eaoh one only in acoord 
Wi th the greater good of the whole man. Upon the maintenanoe 
of thls supremacy· Will depend the peace and order and per-
feotion of the whole man, and this supremaoy, in turn,is under-
stood to rest strictly upon the power of reason to know and 
deslre the true good of the whole man. Imitative ,poetry. 
Plato charges, makes direotly for the disruptlon of this order 
in the soul beoause it distraots reason trom the pursuit ot 
its proper goodandbeoause its inordinate appeal to the senses 
and the splrited element tends to strengthen these powers at 
the cost ot the sapremacy of reason. 
!he iml tative arts, and., of course. poetry among them, 
prevent reason from attainlng to truth and reallty, that is, 
to tbeknowledge of the universal ·ideas· because they conoern 
themselves entirely with the rea~ of theindiv1dual and 
multiple. God, the maker ot all things, Plato maintains;made 
only the true and universal reality: of each kind of thing in 
the world. These are the "ideas·, the universa1 an! eternal 
realities whlch alone are·true and pertect. The individuals 
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wh1ch exist 1n the world ot sense are but 1m1 tat10ns ot these 
un1versa1 rea11t1es and. have truth and rea11ty only 1s so tar 
as they imitate and reproduoe in themselves the perfection of 
the 1deas. And to these 1nd1v1duals,consequently, we do not' 
ascribe the fulness of reality and perfect10n wh1ch we predi-
cate of the ideas, but quite correotly speak of them as imi ta-
tions, appearanoes)or reflections. The individual is the 
obJect o~ sense, the idea the object of the 1ntellect. The 
imitative arts are concerned entirely with the 1nd1vidual. 
They treat and reproduoe, not the eternal and universal reality 
ot any obJect)but only an indiv1dual, a bed or a man or any 
other 1nd1vidual thing. And turther J,because of the1r med1a" 
they are incapable of grasping" even the tota11ty of the 1n-
d1v1dual. They grasp at best only an aspect ot the ind1v1dual, 
an angle ot a part1cular bed, or th1s man as he weeps or 
laughs, and never the totality and the perteotion ot the 1n-
div1dual &S it ought to be aocord1ng to 1 ts eternal pattern. 
Therefore the products of art can rightfully claim to be no 
more than imitat10ns ot an aspeot of an ind1v1dual, essentially 
three removes from truth and reality in the1r fulness. 
Now all this m1ght be condoned 1f the 1m1tat1ve arts 
would reoognize their 11mitations. But this they do not do. 
On the contrar~ they pretend to represent reality, and men are 
asked to aooept their produots a8 authentio representat10ns ,ot 
1_ t1'11 th. But 1 t 1 s ma4De ss to do 80 and 1f ... m&n 1s en t10ed by 
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their pretentions he will forfeit any hope of attaining by the 
exercise of reason to the knowledge of the "ideas". And with 
this he will lose all hope of attaining to the perfection of 
his nature, for in giving himself over to the allurements 
of art he foresakes the only guide whioh can lead him to that 
perfeotion, reason, 
The imitative arts are further guilty of destroying 
the poise and order of the soul by their inordinate appeal to 
the senses. The order of the soul depends upon the proper 
subordination of the senses to reason. The imitative arts, 
because they are oonoerned entirely with individuals, appeal 
only to the senses and to the spirited element of the soul. 
They put forth their produots as souraes of satisfaation to 
the. sight and hearing and the emotions without making any 
appeal to the r~ason to justify and approve this satisfaction. 
~uite the oontrary, art asks us to put our reason in abeyanoe, 
as it were, for the spaoe of time in which we take our plea-
sure in its works, for it asks us to enjoy its products as 
realities, although reason is loud in its protest. And in 
thus appealing to the senses. and to the emotions in open defi-
anoe of reason the imitative arts tend to strengthen the power 
of the former at the oost of the latter and prepare the way 
for disorder in the soul. All that has been said applies with 
especial forae to poetry whioh is the greatest and most power-
ful of the arts. 
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rhus Platots opposition to poetry springs directly 
trom zeal tor his ethical 1deal~ Poetry threatens the very 
foundations of this ideal--the supremacy ot reason among the 
powers of the soul in virtue of its knowledge of reality, 
ultimately ot the Idea ot Good. We must not of course over-
look the tact that Plato seems to have utterly misunderstood 
the true creative processes of art, which are, in their ways 
aPmuch universalizing processes as the activity of reason. 
But this oonsideration opens a question beyond our present 
scope. For Plato, poetry is anathema because, as far as he 
can see, it can not coexist with the athical ideal which 
alone, he thinks, can insure men's happiness. And so he ex-
iles poetry from his perfect state, because truth is greater 
than any man. But he exiles her with great reluctance and 
concludes the matter with the sad out eager words, ftShall I 
propose that she be allowed to return from exile on the con-
dition that she make defense of herself?ft And he lets us feel 
that)in the event of a successful apologYthe will be among 
those eager to welcome her into the ideal City. 
c. Longhay~ 
The worth of the ethical interpretation of literature 
for the purposes of criticism is often impugned on the grounds 
that to Judge literature ethioally is to force upon it norms 
of perfection altogether alien to its intrinSiC nature and its 
1.' 
proper end. !he great ant only concern is beauty. it is ar-
gued, and the essenoe ot beauty is pleasure. These are the 
only legitimate norms ·of literary excellence, beauty and plea-
sure •• oral r1ght and wrong are simply' beside the paint in 
the Judgment of literature. !his view is held by men of great 
author1 ty in the f1eld. But critics of no 18 [cOS merit have 
taken their stand upon the shioal interpretation as the only 
logioal baSis for truitful oritioism. and among these Father 
Longbaye must be numbered. It is his counter-complaint, 
against those who oppose the ethioal oritioism,tb&t they do 
no~ examine the whole question deeply enough. 
An examination of the history of literature reveals 
that literature, as all art, is essentially the produot ot 
man a8 a moral being. The su.bJect-matter of works ot 
literature acknowledged commonly to be the world's master-
pieoes is almost without exoeption some aspeot of man's moral 
lite. !he epios of Homer, the tragedie. of Sophooles and 
Euripides, the tale of ttpius Aeneas", the Divine Comedy, the 
great plays of Shakespeare, the work of the nineteenth 
century in Fran.e, England and other European countries 
and oontemporary literature in general bear eloquent witness 
to the common preoccupation of the art with the vital mo~l 
que.tions. If Homer was appealed to as the ethical monitor 
of Greece, it was because the Sreeks recognized that the poet~ 
ohiet oonoern was an ideal of right living and not mere plea-
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sure.. !he ul time. te motive whioh enabled Dante to undertake 
and oomplete his tremen4OU8 task ot oomposing the "poerna sa ora " 
was the oonviotion that he possessed vital moral thth to 
impart and that literature was the, best ohannel tor its popular 
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oorrmunioation. And whooan fail to see that muoh ot modern 
literature by its very tlaunted amoral charaoter is but otter-
ing another answer to the great persistant moral question? 
Moreover. the taot that the great poets and dramatists have 
most frequently avowed their moral aims cannot be overlooked. 
Euripides and Sophooles, Virgil and Dante openly aftirm their 
moral purpose. !rb.e writers ot the nineteenth oentury who 
were seeking a substitute tor religion either in literature 
and art or 1n innumerable other soul-nostrums frankly 
ad.mi tted their purpose. And in our own day, oould Eugene 
O'Neill, tor instance, deny it? If he did, he oould plead no 
valid reason tor a line he has lITi tten. It may truthtully be 
said that every great literary artist has sought by his writ-
ing to influenoe the moral 'ideas and ideals ot his oontem-
poraries and ot posterity. How is it legitimate to set aside 
the moral oonsiderations ot their work as the illusions of 
graat men, dissipated by modern oritioal thought, as Benedetto 
Crooe would bave us do? If we are truly to ~udge the men, we 
mUst take their work as they wanted it to be taken. 
With these taots before him the literary oritio will 
hesitate to exolude moral considerations tram his Judgments. 
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If he does exclude them he will find himself vaporiz1D.g" a.D4 
not oritioizing, for he Will have lost vital contaot With his 
subJect. It is evident that Father Longhaye realized the 
weight of the historical evidenoe from his V3ry definition of 
, 
literatare, which he oalls, ttl'art de exercer sur l'honooe par 
; la parole une aotion moral, pUissante et ordonee." But his-
torical evidence appears to him more oorroborative than fun-
damental. An analysis of speech. written or spoken, will lead 
to the same conolusion, he maintains. Conoeptual language is 
distinctive of man anddireotly indioative of the presenoe in 
him of intelleot, indioative therefore of his soul. It is the 
soul of man that seeks expression through language, the saul 
of man whioh is made for union with a body" whioh seeks .in-
timate expression of itself in literature. And the ahief, 
rather the onlyJreal ooncern of man's soul. is its destiny. 
Which is a moral issue/obviously. Though the powers of the 
soul may be 'turned to other purposes, their real end is to 
know and will ~'s true happiness. When, as happens in lit-
erature, the soul expresses itself intimately and sinoerely, 
it is impossible that it should not speak of that whioh aon-
oems it so constantly and so alosely. Or, is it conoeivable 
that in this intimate revelation of itself the saul should 
put aside ~is all engrossing interest to give itself over to 
the mere delight of the moment? Who can sinoerely believe so? 
Li tera w.re, as all 0 the r interests am aoti vi ties of the human 
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soul. is naturally subordinate to that one sapreme interest, 
the last end ot man, and to its only important aotivity, the 
attainment of that end. The oonoeption o~ a literature eman-
oipated from the oommon servioe to the last end is unhuman, 
unnatural and suioidal. 
But what is the purpose of this intimate self revela-
tion of the soul? Is it simply to relieve the burden of the 
soul? Oooasionally this may be true, but this would hardly 
explain man's continued effort at literary expression. The 
soul wishes by this expression to oommunioate itself to other 
souls, to share with them its reflexions and to stir them up 
to sympathy with its own afreotions. It seeks to arouse 
essentially moral aotivity in the recipient of its expreSSion. 
that is. activity of the distinctive powers of the soul. To 
this end it bends all its powers, shapes all its means and 
methods. Literary history is naturally in this light the 
record of souls who seek to move the souls of others and to 
mold the subtle and beautiful instrument of language to this 
end. But why, it may ue asked, should this expression take on 
so elaborate a form? Why does not intellectual soul speak to 
intellectual soul by reasoned thought alone? The answer is 
that the intellectual soul is not the man. Though the intel-
leotual prinoiple is the chief constituent of man. the body is 
also essential to human natureJand in our present state the 
aotivity of the intelleot is in a sense conditioned by the 
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ministrations of the body. The soul which seeks to communioate 
itself to other souls knows that its message must pass through 
the hands of this minister. She speaks therefore not merely 
abstraotions and universals but language which will attract 
and arrest sense and emotion also, reaching the higher by the 
lower. Sometimes the intelleot does express itselt in mere 
abstraotions, but then it is not expressing its intimate self. 
Suoh expression is not literature but the symbolism of im-
personal sCienoe. 
Thus, philosophy and history join torces to support 
Father Longhaye's conception of literature: "l'art d'exercer 
~ l'homme par la parole une action moral, puissante et 
I 
ordonnee. ft Further analysis of the constitution of man will 
explain the presence of the last words: "(action) puissante et 
ordonn~e," and will enable us to see the genesis and force 
of the chief laws of literary expression according to Father 
Longhaye: power and order. 
It is obvious that in order to achieve the end of self-
expression, namely, to move other souls to sympathy with it-
self the. soul must use powerful means. Language is its dis-
tinctive and only immediate and unequivocal medium of expres-
sion. Consequently it must make this instrument as powerful 
as possible by adapting it completely to the exigenoies of ex-
pression, that is to the nature ot both recipient and topic, 
as well as to particular ciraumstanoes. Above all, it should 
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try to leave no pOint ot ingress to the other soul unattacked. 
If expression fails in this completeness of its appeal, all 
other precautions for its success will be futile. Sense, the 
emotion, intellect are all, so to speak, legitimate prey to 
the invading foroe. If this force is stopped at the very out-
posts by failing to effeot the capitnlation of the senses, it 
can never hope to gain the citadel. And if after passing the 
outworks it oannot pass the inner fortifications of sensibility 
its effort has been in vain. The oondition of power of appeal 
is then a frontal attaok on the reoipient soul at every vantage 
point, sense, emotion a~ intelleot. Thus only will the day 
be oarried and soul be made to sympathize with soul. 
Yet mere power of appeal is not suffioent, and in the 
advioe to appeal to the whole man there lurks a great danger. 
Besides power, order is required to make the appeal to the 
soul effective and legitimate. Man is indeed body and soul, 
but the soul is vastly superior to the body. It not only 
reoeives the data of sense, but also passes judgment on them 
and rules her aotion in acoord with her judgment. In order; 
then, to move the soul to aotion, the appeal to emotion and 
sense must not outweigh the appeal to intelleot proper, but 
should be proportionate to it and seleoted with attention to 
its appropriateness in the oiroumstances. Unless this is so, 
the soul will be repelled rather than attracted and rendered 
sympathetio. She will rightly judge indisoriminate and ex-
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travagant appeal to be meaningless and will not respond. The 
powerfUL appeal must then be ordered, seeking the aid, and not 
the interferenoe, of the body. The appeal to the senses and 
emotion will be so moderated that the intelleot will always 
be able easi~y and quiokly to perceive the message meant for 
itself in t.he information brought to it. 
Order is also required to make the appeal legitimate~ 
The hierarchy ot taoulties in man is not IllIfrely a help, but is 
the absolute oondition ot the attainment of the last end of 
man. Disorder among the faoulties is disastrous to the 
attainment ot true happiness. Inordinate appeal to the lower 
powers tends to introduoe disorder by strengthening them un-
duely. Consequently it is not legitimate to appeal to the., in 
literary expreSSion, more than to the intelleot. But, it may 
be objeoted, the soul ot the artist has the right to use every 
means it oan to gain its end. Hardly. No man has the right 
tointroduoe suoh disastrous disorder into the soul of another 
human being to gain sympathy there tar himself. The soul whioh 
stoops to suoh means to gain its end is not deserving to be 
heard. Rather it deserves to be silenced. And so one is 
justified. in saying that only the appeal that is ordered in 
acoord with the true and essential order of the soul is legit-
imate and alone deserves to be received with approval. Though 
no one oan prevent disordered appeals from being made, philoso-
phioori ties will condemn them a.s nothing short of oriminal. 
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Fa. ther Longba7e'. 11 terar7 creed r.rdA7 be summe' up in 
his definition of literature given above and in the two great 
laws of gOOd liter&tare he enunoiates. 
~our exercer par 1& parole ~e aotion 
pUissante il faut c1lplo;yer 'a 1& ~ois e~ constam-
ment dans 1& parole toutls les f~cultLes 
oapables d'y conoourir. ft6 
ftToute. les facult~6s d&ivent agir ensemble 
mais sulv&nt leur hllrarchie inve/lriable ef les 
exlgencea vari&blesde leur objet commun.-
It is easily perceived from wbat has bee~ said above how these 
follow from the basic characteristic of Ibis ethical ldeal, '!h. 
fundamental charaoteristios of his ethi.,.u. ideal., as w. sa-J 
.ere the dualism ln man, the superiority .... of soul and the es-
sent1&l hlerarohy of the faoul tle.'s. Fro!- the flrst spring the 
oonceptions behlnd tba deflnltlon of lit,erature ltself. from 
the seoond the laws of good composltion. 
157 
REFERENCES 
CHAPTER V 
1 Rousseau and Romantioism; Intro.J passim; The New 
Le;okoon, pp. 186 sqq. 
2 New LaSlkoon, pp. 192 sqq. 
3 New L~~koon! pp. 217 sqq. 
4: Re~ublic! Bk. X. initio. 
5 ibi.,l. c. 
6 Theorie des Belles-Lettres p. 15. 
7 ibi.,p. 27. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Adams, James, The Republic of Plato. Edited with Notes and 
an Introduction. CambrIdge: University Press. 1902. 
• ••• , Reli~iOuS Teachers of Greece. Edinburgh: T. and T. 
Clark, 1 08. -
Babbitt, Irving, Literature and the American College. New 
York: Houghton Hi:r:r1in Company, 1908. 
• ••• , The New Laokoon. New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 
1910-:- -
• ••• , Masters of 1,{odern French Criticism. New York: 
Houghton Miffiin Company, 1912. 
• ••• , Rousseau and Romanticism. New York: Houghton 
Mifflin Compa~ 1919. 
• •• _, Democracy and Leadership. New York: Houghton 
Mif1'1in Company;J.924. 
Bandas, Rudolph, Contemporary Thought and Thomistic Prin-
ciples. MilwaUkee: The Bruc~PUbI!Shing Company;-r93l. 
I Bremond, Henri, A Literart Histori of Religious Thought in Franoe. New York: T e Macmi lan Company, 192~ --
Burnet, Johannes, editor, Platonis 0lera. Bibliotheca 
Scriptorum Classicorum Oxoniens s. Typographo Claren-
doniano. 
Collin, Henri, ~tanuel de philosophie thomiste. Paris: Pierre 
T'qui, 1931. 
, . 
Dies, Hippolyte, Autour de Platona Essais de critique et 
d' histo.1re. Paris:Gabriel Beauchesne, 1927. 
Donat, Joseph, Ethica. Oeniponte (Innsbruck): Felicianus 
Rauoh, 1934. 
Foerster, Norman, The Amerioan Scholar. Chapel Hill: Univer-
sity of North~ro1ina Press: 1929 • 
• • • • , Towards Standards. New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 
1930. 
Grattan, C. Hartley, editor, Critique of Humanism. New York: 
Brewer and Warren, 1930. 
Jowett, Benjamin and Lewis Campbell, editors, The Text of 
Plato's Republio. Oxford: University Preii7 ~.--
Jowett, BenJamin, translator. The ReEublio of Plato. 
York: P. J. Collier and son; 19 O. --
Longhaye, S. J •• Georges, Th~orie des belles-lettres. 
paris: Pierre T4qui, 1932. -
New 
Mari tain, Jaoques, Introduotion to Philosophl. London: 
Sheed and Ward. 1geO. --
I 
• •••• Distin~er pour unir. Paris: Desoles de Brouwer 
et ole., 1 2. ----
1~roier. Louis J. A •• Le mouvement humaniste aux Etats Unis. 
paris: Haohette. lV28. 
• ••• , The Challe~e of Humanism. New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 93~ 
More, Paul Elmer, Studies in comgarative Religion. Shelburne 
Essays, Vol. VI. New YOrk: • P. PUtnam's Sons. 1909. 
• • • •• Drift of Roma.nti;o~helburne Essays, Vol. VIII. 
New York: :tIOugIiton M. lin Company. 1913. 
• ••• , Platonism. Prinoeton: University Press, 1917. 
• ••• , Demon ot the Absolute. New Shelburne Essays, 
Vol. I. Prinoeton: University Press, 1928. 
Vunson. Gorham. Dilemma of the Liberated. New York: Coward-
Mo Cann, 1930. -- -
Nettleship. Riohard L., Leotures on the Republio of Plato. 
New York: The ]~aomi11an c.ompany-;-I901. --
Pater. Walter, The Renaissance. New York: The Maomillan 
Company, 1m • 
•• _ •• , Plato and Platonian. New York: The Maomillan Com-
pany, 1922:--
Piatt Clodius, Platon. Paris: F~lix Aloan, 1906. 
Signoriello, N., Lexioon Peripatetioum. Rome: Frederic 
Pustet, 1931. 
Zeller. Eduard, Outlines ~ the History ~ Greek Philosophy. 
New York: Haroourt, Brace and Company, 1931. 
The thesis ItChristian HlDl8llismlt , written by 
Aloysius Robert Amadeo Capondgri, S.J., has been 
aooepted by the Graduate Sohool of Loyola University, 
wi th referenoe to form, and by the readers whose names 
appear below, with referenoe to oontent. It is, therefore, 
aooepted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the 
degree of Master of Arts. 
Rev. W.I. Bundsohuh, S.J. Rev. Allan p. Farrell, S.J. 
Rev. A.G. Briokel, S.J. 
